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The purpose of this research was to examine and
analyze the experiences and contributions of the
Western European Union in the light of the organization's
purposes and objectives and in view of the attempts
toward European integration, in order to provide a basis
on which to justify a positive view concerning WEU's
future role in Western Europe, The basic data gathering
method used in conducting this study was a chronological
review of documents and minutes of the WEU Assembly,
published in the Proceedings of the Assembly , This
primary source me.terial was supplemented by numerous
books and articles concerning political, economic, and
military activity in Western Europe. The basic con-
clusion arrived at because of this research is that in
view of the contempory political problems and prospects
in the Atlantic Alliance and in Western Europe, the
Western European Union is destined to play a very
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In 1948, the Western European countries that had
been allies in World War II (Great Britain, France, and
the Benelux Countries) pledged themselves in the Treaty
of Brussels to a joint defense system and agreed upon the
creation of a Western Union Defense Organization with
three commanders-in-chief and a permanent council above
them. The primary motivation to form such an organization
was supplied by the hostile image of the Soviet Union's
intentions compared with the weak state of European de-
fenses. Initially, it was assumed that the United States
would support this move to strengthen European security
from the outside, much in the same manner as it had sup-
ported European economic recovery through the Marshall Plan.
However, because of the magnitude of the perceived threat
posed to American security by the Soviet Union in Europe
and the fact that the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO)
was without sufficient military power and without an effec-
tive economic base, the United States undertook a series of
actions which clearly illuminated the nature of the "revolu-
tion" which had occurred in American foreign policy. Among
these were the Vandenberg Resolution for association with
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2itself, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Be-
cause of the American decision to support a defense organi-
zation with an Atlantic image rather than a European image,
the Brussels Treaty Organisation faded into the background.
The North Atlantic Council superseded the Western Union
Council in defense matters, and the Western Union Supreme
Commands were superseded by the Atlantic Supreme Commands.
The obligations for mutual assistance incurred by the mem-
ber states of the BTO were still in effect; however, the
functions of the organization gradually receded to a point
where they encompassed primarily cultural and social mat-
ters. However, a series of international events in the
early 1950' s served to create the need for a resurrected
form of the BTO.
Although the defense obligations incurred under the
NATO Treaty became effective almost immediately, the actual
strengthening of European defenses was not so readily forth-
coming. But the beginning of the Korean War was soon to
throw a "spotlight'* on the actual state of Western defenses
in Europe. It was readily apparent that Western Europe was
in no better position to repel an attack than South Korea
had been. Neither NATO nor the BTO had the land forces
necessary to halt successfully a large communist land force
sweeping into Europe. The immediate problem was, therefore,
one of how to raise the necessary defensive forces in the
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3simplest and most expeditious manner. The logical answer
to this dilemma was the raising of German troops to defend
West Germany; however, logic and the emotional sentiment of
the rest of the European members of NATO were far apart on
this question.
Feeling the greatest sense of urgency, the United
States took the initiative in the crisis and offered to in-
crease substantially its contribution to European defenses
by way of a senior American officer to be Supreme Allied
Commander, in addition to increased funds, troops, and
equipment. The quid pro quo for this offer was that West
Germany be rearmed and admitted as a full member of NATO.
The offer of vastly increased United States support for
European defenses was highly attractive to the Europeans;
however, in spite of the logic involved, the thought of a
rearmed Germany (only five years after the fall of the
Third Reich) was quite another matter.
After much diplomatic maneuvering, European response
to the American condition came in the form of the Pleven
Plan, for a highly-integrated European Army, which plan was
initiated by the French government. As viewed by certain
members of the French government and other distinguished
Europeans, the Pleven Plan would serve to supervise German
rearmament, while it would also strengthen the movement
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4toward European integration, because of the supranational
aspects of control inherent in the plan.
After some initial reservations about supporting a
European Array instead of direct integration of German troops
into NATO, the United States placed its support behind the
Pleven Plan's creation of a European Defense Community
(EDO, However, the initial European enthusiasm for the
bold move in the area of European defense was not enough to
obtain rapid consent by the proposed member states (France,
the Benelux Countries, Italy, and West Germany). The state
which proved most troublesome, tn spite of growing United
States pressure to accept the EDC, was France. On August
30, 1954, after three years of discussion and debate and
after the other member Parliaments had ratified the EDC
Treaty and the European Political Community (EPC) section
which had been added, the French Parliament rejected the
EDC Treaty.
The various reactions to the French rejection of EDC
immersed the Western Alliance in one of the most severe
crises it had faced since its birth. The sharpest reaction
of all came from the United States, which had been one of
the strongest advocates of the plan, because it deemed the
plan a vital and necessary step toward strengthening
Western defenses. The most pessimistic observers inter-
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5of the Western Alliance. Whether this was actually the
case is irrelevant; the point is that the severity of the
crisis caused the creation of a new organization to fill in
the gap left by the "corpse" of EDC. The organization,
which is the subject of this research, is the Western
European Union (WEU), an organization built on the existing,
but lifeless, body of the Brussels Treaty Organization or
Western Union
«
The primary reason for the creation of WEU, in 1955,
was to provide a means of rearming West Germany and inte-
grating her military forces into the NATO Army, and, in
addition, to welcome her officially into the community of
Western nations as a sovereign and equal member—except for
certain armament restrictions. In addition to being a
Beans for accomplishing this ^nd, WEU, as an organization,
was given certain functions in various areas of European
activity. The most significant of these was its duty to
control the level of armaments of the member states. The
remaining areas of WEU 1 * responsibility included functions
in European defense planning and functions in the area of
European social and cultural activity.
Although WEU became an operating European organiza-
tion under the London and Paris Agreements of 1954, it has
never enjoyed the full confidence and support of its mem-
ber states. From the beginning of its existence, the WEU
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6has been viewed by many only as a stop-gap measure—an
expedient to relieve the pressure created by the EDC crisis.
The very fact that the organization was rather inadvertently
given a parliamentary organ, the Assembly (because of a
reference in the listed duties of the Council of Ministers)
illustrates the haste in which WEU was conceived and the
thought which was given to its future usefulness. In spite
of these unusual working conditions, the WEU has weathered
through the experience of non-support by its member states
and, while doing so, has contributed significantly to the
cause of European integration. Prom time to time, ob-
servers of the European scene have accused the organization
of being superfluous—charging that WEU is merely dupli-
cating the work done by other European organizations.
These charges are followed by proposals to dissolve the WEU
and/or the transfer of its functions to existing or pro-
posed organizations.
Some of the charges were valid and have resulted in
the WEU voluntarily transferring some of its allotted func-
tions to other organizations. Some of WEU's military func-
tions have been absorbed by NATO, while its work in the
cultural and social areas has been transferred to the Coun-
cil of Europe. Unfortunately, this logical reorganization
of tasks has led some to believe that the WEU is in the
ambiguous position of an organization without a purpose.
-•.
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7This is not the case. The WEU has played an important and
a useful role in Europe thus far, and it is the opinion of
this author that WEU is destined to play a central role in
the European organization of the future.
The purpose of this research is to examine and
analyze the experiences and contributions of WEU in light
of the organization^ purposes and objectives and in view
of the attempts toward European integration, in order to
provide a basis on which to justify the view concerning
WEU's role in the future.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
In order to understand clearly the forces which
caused the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) in
the mid-1950' s, it is first necessary to review briefly the
major international events which brought this action about.
Central to the entire period is the rise and fall of the
planned European Defense Community (EDO and the repercus-
sions its fate had on American relations with Western Europe,
Prior to June, 1950, in the period of infancy for
NATO, there was a great deal of serious discussions and
planning on an elementary level by representatives from the
member states concerning the needs and goals of Western
defense in Europe. The zeal with which the problems were
discussed, however, was by no means overwhelming for a num-
ber of reasons. Among them was the fact that tensions over
Berlin had receded somewhat and the Western European states
were heavily committed financially to their own problems
—
domestic ones and those arising in their colonial empires.
However, the outbreak of the Korean War served to inject a
new sense of urgency into the planning stage talks about
European defense. The actions of the communists in the Far
East caused a wave of fear to pervade Western Europe which
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9anticipated a similar invasion by the communists into the
Western European area.
One of the immediate results of this flurry of
activity concerning new measures to be taken for Europe's
defenses was the further institutionalization of NATO. The
Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization quickly
agreed to the following measures—the creation of an inte-
grated NATO defense force under centralized command and the
establishment of an international staff and the Standing
Group to assist the Supreme Commander in carrying out his
expanded responsibilities. There was one main issue,
however, which the Council could not agree upon—the rais-
ing of German troops to aid in Europe's defense. The pro-
posal for the rearming of Germany had come from Mr. Acheson,
the American Secretary of State, who advanced the strong
American opinion that Germany had to be rearmed if NATO was
2to be prepared to do its Job.
The American case for German rearmament was logical
enough in terms of statistics; however, it was still an
emotionally-packed issue for the Europeans to consider
realistically, in spite of the perceived threat tt<M the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Britain









Soviet Union. The United States then proceeded to make its
position clear in the situation by offering to underwrite
in troops, equipment, and money the strengthening of NATO
but on the condition that a German contribution could be
3
arranged in a reasonable amount of time. The global
nature of United States defense commitments, coupled with
the internal problems and colonial difficulties of major
Western European nations (such as, France and Great Britain),
seemed to point to German rearmament as the only plausible
course in the minds of American policymakers.
Primary among the obstacles which stood in the path
of German rearmament was French opposition to rearming
Germany and German reservations about rearming unless they
were guaranteed full partnership status with the West.
After several months of deliberation concerning the
dilemma created by the United States position, the primary
European solution was offered in the form of the "Pleven
Plan" which called for the creation of a European Array com-
posed of forces from each of the member states that would
4
operate under joint control.
In February, 1951, a conference of representatives
from the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community
3Ibid .
Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.), France
Defeats SDC (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 4-7.
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(ECSC) waa called in Paris by the French government to dis-
cuss the merits of the "Pleven Plan," By December of the
same year, a firm plan for a European Defense Community
(EDC), under the Joint control of a joint Defense Commis-
sion, was agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of the Six,
The EDC was to be composed of the Commission, a Council of
Ministers with an Assembly and a Court of Justice parallel
to the institutions of the ECSC. By May, 1952, the Treaty
establishing the EDC was signed by the Foreign Ministers of
the Six. 5
British official reaction toward the proposed EDC
was much the same as it had been toward the ECSC* The
British government strongly supported the plan as a posi-
tive and necessary step for the Six; however, for a variety
of reasons, they felt that Great Britain was unable to join
such an organization. In November, 1950 } Mr. Bevin, the
British Foreign Secretary, explained the British rejection
of EDC membership to the House of Commons on the grounds
that a European Army would only delay the defense of Europe
and that the European framework was too restricted for
effective defense. These reasons given by the Foreign
5European Organizations (London: George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd., 1959)", p. 12.
|
Kans Joachim Heiser , British Policy with Regard to
Unification Efforts on the European Continent (Leyden; ~Kl
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12
Secretary no doubt supply part of the basis for Great
Britain's position; however, the primary reason seemed to
be that Great Britain was not ready to admit her relative
decline in great power status by tying herself primarily to
Europe. Great Britain's position, during the EDC negotia-
tions and her subsequent positions on the later movements
toward European integration (Common Market and Euratom),
reflect the continuing British illusion that she still re-
tained the world power status she held in World War II*
This distorted British self image, which certainly did not
serve her best interests and which even the results of the
Suez affair could not immediately dispel, remained para-
mount in British policy until the early 1960 's. Great
Britain would consent to being associated with the defense
efforts, similar to the American relationship with Europe
and she would agree to commit national forces to the Con-
tinent, but that was the extent of the affiliation Great
Britain desired.
The reaction of the United States toward EDC was
strongly positive. Beginning in 1950, the United States
began pressuring our NATO Allies to rearm Germany in order
to facilitate fulfillment of conventional force levels in
the "forward area." To soothe French fears of a rearmed
Germany, the United States directed all its influence







the American point of view, the EDC would serve the dual
purpose of strengthening NATO defenses securely to the
Western camp. American Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles campaigned vigorously on behalf of EDC among the
rest of NATO. When, after over two years of delay, the
French Chamber of Deputies was the only parliament of the
Six to turn down EDC, there were strong indications of an
impending change of United States policy toward Europe.
The situation confronted the Eisenhower Administration with
what Mr. Dulles termed "an agonizing reappraisal of its
7basic foreign policy toward Europe." The birth of WEU a
few short months later would appear to have everted any
radical change in American-European policy. What changes
would have occurred without WEU are extremely difficult to
predict. Basically, there were three possible courses of
action for the United States to pursue: a reduction of the
American commitment to Europe (the apparent intent of the
threat); a prolonged acceptance of the status quo of
European defenses at that time; or an increased American
commitment in spite of the lack of compliance with American
requests (proving the threat was, indeed, an idle one).
Considering the value placed by the United States on the
7
United States Department of State, Bulletin






physical security of Europe in the context of the total
American security system and the extent of the heavy Ameri-
can military commitment to Europe in the early 1950*3, the
first course of action seems highly unlikely. The most
probable course of United States policy, even if WEU had
not appeared almost immediately would have been somewhere
between tne two latter courses.
In spite of strong American support for EOC and the
milder British willingness to associate itself with EOC,
the Treaty was eventually rejected by the French National
Assembly. From May of 1952 until the fatal vote in August,
1954, successive French governments refused to submit the
EDC Treaty to debate because they each doubted their
ability to secure a favorable vote for it. Finally, in
August, 1954, as a result of many pressures and circum-
stances, the Government of Premier Mendes-France submitted
the Treaty to the French Assembly where it was rejected by
a combination of Communists, Gaullists, Socialists, and
8Radicals.
The reasons for the French rejection of the Treaty
are a result of the complex blend of the political atmos-
phere in France during that period. Among the major
reasons were: (1) France *s reluctance to participate in a
p






defense organization with Germany without Great Britain
being a member of the organization; and (2) French National-
ist's opposition to the submerging of the French Armed
Forces into a supranational organization when Great Britain
refused to do so.
Upon the French refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty,
the prob*»>m of how to rearm Germany in a manner which
France would accept seemed to take on a new sense of
urgency for Great Britain and the other European nations
concerned with NATO defense. Great Britain represented in
the person of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was to take the
initiative in attempting to fill the void left by the then
dead EDC Treaty. On August 31, 1954, the very day of the
publication of the failure of EDC, the London Times made
the following observations:
• • • • Speed and decision are now essential. The
least France can do is to make no difficulties about
the restoration of Germany sovereignty , • • • The
next few weeks are as vital as recent months have
been.
The lead for a new framework within which to build
German rearmament and ally her to the West, would
now best come from Great Britain.
In spite of the great shift of power, it is still to
this country that France looks, rather than the
United States .... Sir Winston Churchill and Mr.
Eden now have it in their power to play the decisive
part which they have hitherto felt themselves pre-
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as the French veto is. it gives Britain a second
chance to lead Europe. 9
The British government took the initiative when, on
September 2, it suggested a conference of the Six, the
United States, Canada, and Great Britain. Mr* Eden then set
off on a continental tour where he, in rapid succession,
visited with the governments of the six EDC signatory na-
tions. The purpose of the trip was to lay the groundwork
for the success of the impending conference. The form Mr.
Eden's solution took was basically: (1) to end the allied
occupation in Germany and to re-establish German sover-
eignty; (2) to invite Germany to become a full and equal
member of NATO; and (3) to bring West Germany and Italy
into the Western-European security system of the Brussels
10Treaty Organization.
The reasons for the seemingly rapid ''about face" of
British attitude toward involvement with Europe, although
never officially stated as such, seemed to be based on the
following:
1. The realization that EDC was for all practical
purposes dead and the problem it was supposed
to solve remained growing older and in a sense
more urgent u&y by day. While the exact
future of EDC remained suspended, Great
Britain seemed to take comfort in the thought
that somehow it would get through without a
genuine commitment on her part. Because EDC
was dead Great Britain seemed to realize that
without h&r commitment the problem would not
be solved*
9 10Heiser, op . clt * t p. 67. Ibid ., p. 68,
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2. The British, feeling that perhaps their attitude
and aloofness toward EDC, contributed heavily
toward its defeat.
3. The thought that perhaps a strong supranational
organization like EDC could have held some
serious disadvantages for Great Britain if she
was completely outside the organization.
4. The strong pressures brought to bear by the
United States on Great Britain to correct the
British-aided debacle.
Two conditions for any alternative organization to
replace the EDC became clear after Mr. Eden's talks on the
Continent. First, the creation and success of any such
system would require and depend on full British participa-
tion. A second condition was that the organization must
provide for German rearmament. These conditions were recog-
nized in a communique issued by Mr. Eden and M. Mendes-
France after their meetings in Paris on September 15 and 16.
Having already agreed in principle to these primary condi-
tions for a substitute defense organization, the representa-
tives to the Nine Power Conference held in London took less
than six days to draft their decisions into document form.
The document was titled "The Final Act of the Nine
Power Conference held in London between September 28 and
October 3, 1554." Among the primary decisions and declara-










1. The occupation regime in West Germany should be
ended and German sovereignty should be re-
established;
2. The Federal Republic of Germany would be Invited
to join NATO.
3. The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would
be invited to accede to the Brussels Treaty
•
4. In addition to expanded membership of the BTO,
the functions and responsibilities would be
enlarged particularly in the areas of European
defense and armaments*
5. The name of the Brussels Treaty Organization be
changed to Western European Union (WEU)
•
6. That Great Britain (in addition to being a mem-
ber of WEU), Canada, and the United States
should declare their support of European unity,
including a particular British pledge to keep
four divisions and a tactical air force on the
Continent. 12
In order to expand the declarations and decisions
embodied in the "Final Act" of the London Conference into a
full-fledged treaty, the representatives, after having time
to consult with their own governments, adjourned to Paris
to constrxict the treaty. The agreements were drawn up in a
series of protocols which were signed by the Foreign Minis-
ters of the countries concerned on October 23, 1954, in
Paris. The main points provided for in these documents,
known as the Paris Agreements, were:
12United States Department of State, London and Paris
Agreements September-October 1954 (Washington: Government
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1. Amendment and expansion of the Brussels Treaty
to include Western Germany and Italy.
2. Changing the name of the BTO to WEU.
3. The termination of the occupation regime in
Western Germany*
4. The admission of the German Federal Republic to
NATO.
5. A Franco-German agreement on the Saar, which was
to have a European Statute within the frame-
work of WEU. 13
A very logical question comes to mind at this point
—
why was the EDC unacceptable to Great Britain and France,
whereas the WEU proposal had Just the opposite results? As
far as Great Britain was concerned, the WEU was acceptable
because it contained none of the supranational tendencies
or implications of the EDC which she felt unable to partici-
pate in. By being a full member of an intergovernmental
organization like WEU, Great Britain could retain a definite
voice in the matters of European defense without suffering
the loss of any sovereignty to a supranational executive.
The EDC was found wanting in French eyes because France
feared German rearmament in the context of an organization
in which she was the only major power. There was no con-
crete guaranty in the French view that Great Britain or
NATO would accept a major role in controlling the creation
13
Ibid








of new German military forces. On the other hand, WEU made
German rearmament acceptable to France because it was accom-
panied by a British commitment to full membership in the
organisation and a treaty pledge to maintain forces on the
Continent. This was accompanied by a German pledge to
agreed-upon force levels and restrictions on certain arma-
ments plus the fact that German admission to NATO was pro-
vided for.
The most important provisions for modifying and com-
pleting the revision of the Brussels Treaty were contained
in four protocols. The first protocol begins in Article I
by recording the admission of West Germany and Italy to the
organisation. In Article II, the Preamble to the Treaty is
modified by deleting the aim of concerted action "in the
event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" and
substitutes the object of "promoting the unity and encour-
aging the progressive integration of Europe." Then follow
the three main provisions of the protocol. The first is
the addition of a new Article IV providing for close coopera-
tion with NATO. It states:
Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the
Military Staff of KATO, the Council and its agency
will rely on the appropriate military authorities
of NATO for information and advice on military
matters.
The second provision amends Article VII of the











creation of a* n*v; body to be known as the Council of the
Western European Union. The Council was to concern itself
with matters related to execution of the Treaty and was to
exercise its functions continuously. The third provision
inserted a new Article IX establishing the Western European
Union Assembly. It states:
The Council of the Western European Union shall make
an annual report on its activities and in particular
concerning the control of armaments to an Assambly
composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty
Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council
of Europe. *4
Article 1Kb) of the Pinal Act of the London Confer-
ence provided that the Consultative Council of the Brussels
Treaty should become "a Council with powers of decision."
The new Article VIII of the amended Treaty provided that
the Council of Western European Union ia created
... for purposes of strengthening peace and
security and of promoting unity and of encouraging
the progressive integration of Europe and closer
cooperation between the Parties and with other
European organizations .... [and] to consider
matters concerning the execution of the Treaty and
of its Protocols and their Annexes.
Voting in the Council was to be decided by unanimity,
a two-thirds majority, or a simple majority on various











matter not covered by a specific provision, the rule of
15
unanimity would apply.
The membership of the Council of the WEU consists of
the Foreign Ministers of the member states. Although there
is a provision stating that the Council will exercise its >
n
functions continuously, it is obvious that Foreign Ministers
could not meet in continuous session; therefore, in the
absence of the Ministers, the Council is to consist of the
i
i
member states' ambassadors resident in London plus an Under
Secretary of the British Foreign Office. In the latter
16
case, the meetings are chaired by the Secretary General.
Protocol II is concerned with "Forces of Western
European Union." Certainly from a military point of view
and in many respects from a political point of view, this
protocol is the most important because it places upper
limits on the size of land and air forces the member states
will maintain on the European Continent during peacetime.
The limits for Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and
the Netherlands are the same as those laid down in the
Special Agreement annexed to the EDC Treaty. Luxembourg's
limit is one regimental combat team. The upper limit on
15
A. H. Robertson, European Institutions (New York:
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Great Britain'* c: tinental Forces is four divisions and
17
the Second Tactical Air Force. Article VI to this proto-
col contains the British commitment , first made by Sir
Anthony Eden during the London Conference, that for the
duration of the Treaty the United Kingdom:
• • • will continue to maintain on the mainland of
Europe, Including Germany, the effective strength
of the United Kingdom forces which are now supplied
to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to
say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air
Force or such other forces as the Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent
fighting capacity. 18
The British commitment, however, is qualified by the state-
ment that, although the United Kingdom has agreed
not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of
the majority of the High Contracting Parties who
should take their decisions in the knowledge of the
views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in
the event of an acute overseas emergency. Xf the
maintenance of the United Kingdom Forces on the
mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a
strain on the external finances of the United King-
dom, she will ... invite the North Atlantic
Council to review the financial conditions on
which the United Kingdom formations are maintained. 1 '
While tnis British pledge did not increase the existing
British forces in Europe and, in effect, made no real
physical change in the existing situation, the importance
17United States Department of State, London and
Paris Agreements , op . cit . , p. 42.





of it 11 fact that Great Britain here committed
herself to a certain measure of majority rule in a European
organization. The British action was interpreted by some
as follows:
By taking this "formidable" decision the United
Kingdom turned its back on its traditional policy
and threw in its lot with the Continent. The im-
portance of the move lies not only in the commit-
ment to maintain British forces on the Continent,
but much more In the willingness to accept a
majority decision as to the length of timy they
will be stationed there. 20
In addition, the British pledge certainly did much to re-
assure the French public in their uneasiness about German
rearmament
•
Protocol III and its four annexes recorded the
agreeir^nt of the other WEU members with the Declaration of
the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic ai Germany
that Germany would not manufacture in its territory, atomic,
biological, or chemical weapons. Germany further pledged
not to produce long-range or guided missiles, large war-
ships, or strategic bombers without the consent of a two-
thirds majority of the Council of WEU. In the same protocol,
the other members agree that their stocks of various weapons
shall be subject to control, but these were not at all as
restrictive as the pledges required of Germany.
20Robertson, op . clt . , p. 133.
2 1g3id . 1 pp. 51-57.
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The fourth protocol provides for the establishment
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which is
charged with ensuring that the obligations incurred on the
manufacture of certain types of armaments in Protocol III
are observed. The Agency is responsible to the Council and
subject to the general administrative control of the Secre-
tary General of W2U. The Agency is empoitferad to examine
statistical and budgetary information, ana to carry inspec-
22tions of government-controlled defense establishments.
"
The general framework into which WEU was pia.eeJ was
provided by the Brussels Treaty Organisation created in
March, 1948. The Brussels Treaty, to which Great Britain,
France, and the Benelux Countries were parties, was a
"treaty of economic, social, and cultural collaboration and
collective self-defense, n and was concluded or a fifty-
year period. Significant among the commitments contained
in the Treaty is Article IV which deals with collective
defense as follows:
If any of the High Contracting Parties should oe the
object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High
Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, afford the Patty attacked all the military
and other aid and assistance in their power. 2
3
This is a much more direct and compelling obligation than








that contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty
which states that each partner will, in the event of attack,
take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use
of armed force,"
Under the terms of the Treaty, an organization was
established to carry out its functions in the defense,
economic, social, and cultural areas. However, the BTO
soon lost most of its relevance in the defense field with
the creation of NATO in 1949. The defense machinery
created prior to NATO became the machinery for the Western
Regional Planning Group, one of five regional planning
25groups established by the North Atlantic Council, One
month after the creation of the BTO, the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation came into being and thereby
took over the responsibilities of the BTO in the economic
field. Thus being shorn of its two most important areas
of activity, the BTO was left with its duties in the social
and cultural areas. The organization accomplished a great
deal in these areas, initially; however, with the creation
of the Council of Europe (COE), in 1949, it acquired a
competitor for its remaining areas of competence.
24
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO
Handbook (Utrecht: Bosch, 1963), p. ii,










It was into this existing, but less than dynamic,
framework that WEU was molded with some major revisions as
described in the Paris protocols. The new organization
thus started out with a dubious legacy from its parent
organization which certainly did not strengthen its chances
for a meaningful existence. In addition, it is obvious
that WEU was an organization created in haste, a second-
best choice seemingly forced on its member states by cir-
cumstances rather than by choice. In view of the events
which led to its creation and the hidden pressures which
stimulated it, the charge of stop-gap measure or crisis
choice certainly contains some credibility. However, in
spite of its shaky foundations, WEU has survived and has
done a credible job in so doing.
The most important change which took place in the
structure of the BTO when it was transformed into the WEU
was the addition of a parliamentary assembly which would
provide the legislative scrutiny for the new organization.
Because of the casual nature of the reference by which the
Assembly of the WEU was created, it is fairly reasonable to
assume that the Ministers of the seven powers who shaped
the new organization intended that the WEU Assembly would
meet briefly before or after the meetings of the Consulta-
tive Assembly to discuss the subject of armament control.
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However, this proved to be a significant underestimation of
the parliamentarians' desires to carry out the responsibili-
ties they felt they were charged with.
Article V of the first protocol provided for the
body that was to become the Assembly of the WEU in the fol-
lowing brief manner:
The Council of WEU shall make an annual report on its
activities, and in particular concerning the control
of armaments, to an Assembly composed of representa-
tives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe .26
Thus, in a single reference (which became Article IX
of the amended Treaty), a parliamentary body was estab-
lished to which the Council was, in a limited sense, respon-
sible because of the requirement to submit an annual report.
The desire to create a body which would exercise some
measure of parliamentary control over the activities of the
organization appears logical and justified; however, the
absence of defining parameters within which the body was to
operate appears quite strange. Normally, when a new insti-
tution or inter-governmental organization is established,
the establishing treaty or document clearly defines the
following points about the organization:
1. Its general composition and its powers in the
executive and legislative sense.
26United States Department of State, London and










2. The procedures to be followed by the organiza-
tion.
3. The privileges and immunities of its members.
274. How the organization will be financed.
Lengthy sections of the documents establishing the Council
of Europe and the ECSC were devoted to defining clearly
such items; however, the Assembly of the WEU had no such
help or restrictions to guide it. Because of this unique
situation, the Assembly experienced much difficulty in the
first few years of existence in defining its functions and
its relationship with the Council*
When the Assembly met for the first time on July 5,
1955, its first order of business was the quite novel one
of defining the parameters within which it would operate.
The Assembly drafted a charter and a set of rules of proce-
dure which were introduced at the October meeting of the
First Session of the Assembly. The draft proposals were
modified by certain amendments in April, 1956, at the
Second Session, after which the Charter was adopted in its





29Document 3 in Proceedings of the Assembly of The
Western European Union , First Session, October, 1U5T7 pp.
178-181. LHereafter referred to as Proceedings .
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the broad scope of power and responsibility the Assembly
felt competent to grant itself,
(a) The Assembly carries out the parliamentary
functions arising from the application of the Brussels
Treaty. In particular, the Assembly may proceed on
any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty and
upon any matter submitted to the Assembly for an
opinion by the Council.
(b) The Assembly shall determine its own agenda
in conformity with the provisions of paragraph (a)
above and having due regard to the activities of
other organizations.
Later in the Charter, there are indications that the Assem-
bly has the power to: (1) "make recommendations or transmit
opinions to the Council on any matter ... falling within
the terms of reference of WEU," and to pass resolutions, if
considered appropriate, for transmission to governments 1
national parliaments, or international organizations; (2)
to consider reports made by the Council, especially concern-
ing the work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and
the Standing Armaments Committee; and (3) transmit written
questions to the Council on "any matter relevant to the
Brussels Treaty, to the protocols thereto and on any matter
31
submitted to the Assembly for an opinion."
It is obvious from this broad scope of power that
the Assembly saw fit to grant itself that the parliamen-
tarians were not going to be content with a minor role for
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the organization or for themselves within the framework of
WEU. This attitude on the part of the initial membership
of the Asseiobly was to have two definite effects on the
life of the organization. First, it created the sense of
independence and responsibility which was to become £ pri-
mary characteristic of the Assembly within the organization.
Second, and equally important in trying to understand one
of the main dilemmas of the WEU, the actions of the Assem-
bly in ascribing to themselves broad powers of parliamen-
tary inspection served to alarm the member governments.
The Assembly's actions were perceived by some as an attempt
to give the organisation more power than the member govern-
ments had intended. This initial perception is certainly
one of the bases for the continued non-support the organi-
zation was to receive from the national government.
The Charter provides that the Assembly must meet
annually and in any special sessions which may be called by
the President of the Assembly, requested by the Council, or
requested by one quarter of the members. The regular ses-
sions are held in Strasbourg and are normally timed to
coincide with the meetings of the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe (because WEU Assembly members are
also members of that body). The Assembly consists of eighty-
nine members, eighteen each from Germany, France, the United
vId«o«eA 'iacl
actasoi t jsJ-
a* ej» •not . cuWMaA <MiT




ii»l *> u-.oa sA wfT £•
32
Kingdom, and Italy; seven each from Belgium and the Nether-
32lands; and three from Luxembourg
•
The President of the Assembly and six vice presi-
dents are elected annually at the beginning of each regular
session. These seven men form the Bureau of the Assembly
which is responsible for preparing a draft agenda for each
session as well as general administrative direction. The
Assembly has four permanent committees, vrhich are: the
Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, the General
Affairs Committee, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs
Administration, and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and
Privileges. The chairmen of these Committees, added to the
membership of the Bureau, form the Presidential Committee
which acts as a steerinq committee. The Presidential Com-
mittee adopts the agenda and provides the President with a
broad view of the activities being carried on by the Assem-
33bly and its committees.
Two unique constitutional features of the Assembly
are the fact that it has a separate budget entirely apart
from the main WEU budget, and it has its own independent
Secretariat. The Assembly's budget is prepared by the Com-
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Once the President is satisfied, he submits the budget
first to the Assembly and then to the Council, If the
Council is not satisfied to the extent that it wishes to
make any changes greater than 20 per cent on any subhead,
then a meeting must take place between representatives from
the Assembly and the Council.
The membership of the Assembly is organized into
three main political groupings-—Christian Democrat, Social-
ist, and Liberals—with some smaller unaffiliated groups.
Official recognition is gained by any political group as
soon as there are nine or more official delegates belonging
to that group. Although, in theory, the basis for future
European parties is being formed here, in fact, very slight
progress along these lines appears to have been made.
National parties have acted together much more than party
groups on specific official positions taken by the Assem-
34bly. This is not an unusual development, considering the
very elementary progress made toward political integration
in Western Europe. Certainly, if the integration movement
picks up speed again, even the elementary multi-national
party experience gained in organizations like the WEU and
the Council of Europe will be invaluable.
Kenneth Lindsay, European Assemblies (New York:
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The Assembly's Charter provides the members of the
Council and other Ministers of the member states with the
right to be present at all Assembly sittings. When attend-
ing, they may be heard at their own request or at the
request of the Assembly. There is also a provision for
Council members and Ministers to attend committee meetings
where they have the right to speak but they may not vote.
Committees and individual Assembly members also have the
right to address questions to the Council. However, re-
plies may be refused by the Council or postponed when the
Council feels a reply would be contrary to "European public
interest." If no reply is received from the Council in a
month's time, then the question plus the indication of non-
35
reply is published by the Assembly. A method of direct
questioning of the Council through its representative
appears implicit in the Charter's provision for presenta-
tion of the Annual Report. Upon conclusion of an oral
presentation of the Report by the Chairman of the Council,
the Charter provides that "representatives may raise
matters in the course of debate, to which the Chairman of
the Council may reply."
35Document 3, Proceedings , First Session, October,
1955, p. 191, Rule 45~
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Frequent uso of the right to question the Council,
beginning with the Council's first Annual Report, has been
made. Twenty-six questions were asked by the Assembly
President at the request of the Committee on Defense Ques-
tions and Armaments, and replies were received in less than
two months. . The Council has requested, however, that a
clear distinction be made between committee questions sub-
mitted in connection with the Annual Report and questions
of individual members. The Council has expressed a desire
that only committee questions be considered during the
general debate on the Annual Report. Other questions ar«
to be discussed during separate debate or via another means.
During 1955 and 1955, the precedent of personal presenta-
tion of the Annual Report by the Council Chairman was estab-
lished; however, in no case were the replies of the Presi-
dent to questioning of such a nature as to concede any
greater measure of political responsibility to the Assera-
37bly. The Council has never admitted to a degree of
political responsibility to the Assembly comparable to a
government Minister's responsibility to his own national
parliament, nor is it likely to in the present set of
relationships which exist between the WEU and its member
37
M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union














governments. The WEU is strictly an intergovernmental
organization in the view of the member states; therefore,
any attempt, on the part of the Assembly, to make the
Council responsible to it, in the normal democratic
executive-legislative relationship, is viewed as being
beyond the bounds of the commitment incurred when the
London and Paris Agreements were agreed to.
Because the Assembly was left free to determine its
own areas of competence and its relationship with the Coun-
cil, a certain amount of friction has always existed
between the two bodies. When Mr. Spaak addressed the first
meeting of the Assembly in July, 1955, on behalf of the
Council of Ministers, he made certain suggestions to the
Assembly to the effect that the Assembly should not be too
ambitious with respect to the powers and privileges it
claimed. Near the end of his speech, he commented:
The Council of the Union has not wished to force its
views on you. On the contrary, we are determined to
leave you the greatest possible freedom, relying on
your personal experience and your wisdom; but we feel
justified in putting a few suggestions before you. 39
However, the Committee on Organization, chaired by M. von
der Goes von Maters, drew up the Charter, appeared to pay
little heed to Mr. Spaak' s advice. The Council was not
entirely pleased with the draft Charter and particularly
38
Proceedings , First Session, July, 1955, p. 24.
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with one proposal suggesting the Assembly make provisions
for "a vote of general disagreement" with the Council.
The provision which was, in effect, an attempt to provide
for votes of no confidence or censure similar to the pre-
rogative held by the ECSC Common Assembly over the High
Authority read as follows
:
A motion to disagree to the report or to a part of it,
shall be tabled in writing by at least ten Represen-
tatives •
The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put
to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after
it has been tabled, shall require a majority of the
Representatives to the Assembly
.
4u
This controversial proposal caused t storm of debate
when the draft Charter was presented. Those opposed to the
measure felt the proposal offered no positive gain because
the Assembly was powerless to remove the Council from
office if it did pass a vote of no confidence. The pro-
posal was accepted by the Assembly after the debate and was
a source of concern in the member governments because it
demonstrated a very clear difference of opinion between the
governments and the Assembly as to what the relationship
between Council and Assembly should be.
39Robertson, o£. cit . , p. 139.
40Proceedings , First Session, October, 1955, p. 179
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The Council 1 s view of this action was presented by
the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. Beyen, when, in his capacity
as Chairman of the Council, he presented the Annual Report
a few days later. First, he acknowledged the duty of the
Assembly to reflect public opinion, as follows:
The voice of public opinion in our countries can
make itself heard through the Assembly, and on the
other hand, the Council has a forum where it can
explain its activities to that public opinion.
When we speak of "public opinion" we think of the
combined public opinion in our countries, and this
is a very important point.
Western European Union is not a community of coun-
tries in the sense of the Coal and Steel Community.
It has no executive organ responsible to a common
Parliament. The Council of Ministers of Western
European Union consists of Ministers who are each
of them responsible to their national Parliaments
for what they do in their capacity as members of
that Council. Therefore, they cannot be responsible
also, in the Parliamentary sense of the word, either
individually or collectively to the Assembly of WEU.
Therefore, your Assembly is a consultative Assembly.
The importance of this consultative capacity is far
from negligible. Though it does not invest the
Assembly with actual power over the Council of Minis-
ters it can exert a great deal of influence. 41
Mr. Beyen then went on to explain why the Council
felt it unwise for the Assembly to consider the use of
votes of no confidence or censure. After first explaining










the Council members or the Council Staff and might possibly
have no effect at all, he went on to warn:
If, however, it would remain without effect at all,
the relations between the Assembly and the Council
would be severely jeopardised. The Council would
have to take any specific advice of the Assembly
into very serious consideration. It could never
completely ignore such advice, and the least it
should have to do is to talk matters over, but it
would almost certainly be bound to Ignore a general
vote of disagreement or censure. This would create
a situation which should be carefully avoided in the
interest of European cooperation*42
The Assembly* s rebuttal and reaction to Mr. Seyen's
interpretation of the Assembly's proper role came from M.
von der Goes vcn Maters (Chairman of the Committee on
Organization) in the following manner:
The second point which seems to cause the Council
anxiety is the danger of confusion between a motion
of censure and the "motion to disagree" which is
mentioned in the Charter • • • • We are a realistic
body composed of experienced and realistic Members of
Parliament knowing full well where their powers lie
and where they come to an end*
If the Minister believes, and I do not think he does,
that only motions of approval should be allowed, then
I am bound tee say quite frankly that an Assembly of
that kind would be of no interest to me.
Our purpose in doing so (including the motion to
disagree) was to impose certain limitations of a
self-evident democratic right: the right to dis-
agree as well as agree. 4 3
In spite of fir. Seven's observation and after a
joint meeting of the Council and representatives from the
42Xbid
. , p. 154.
43
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Assembly to review the draft Charter, the provision for mo-
tions to disagree remained. The only modification which
resulted was the Assembly's assent to a Council request that
a motion to disagree must relate specifically to the content
of the Annual Report and not to more general dissatisfac-
tion. The provision was amended by the Assembly on April
23, 1956, to read:
A motion to disagree to the content of the report, or
to a part of the report, shall be tabled in writing
by at least ten Representatives.^4
In addition to the controversial subject of "the
motion to disagree," there were other powers, although of
lesser importance, the Assembly granted to itself which
served to irritate the Council, the member States and in
some cases the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe. Because the Assembly of the WEU is, in reality, a
consultative Assembly, in spite of the dislike of the term
by that body, its assumption of a measure of independence
greater than the Consultative Assembly has led to a certain
amount of jealousy. Some of the powers in question are:
(1) the right of the President to convene extraordinary
sessions of the Assembly without the prior consent of the
Council under Article III; (2) the power of the President
to transmit resolutions direct to the member governments,
44Proceedings , Second Session, April, 1956, p. 44.
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parliaments, and other international bodies under Article
V; and (3) the powers of the Assembly to hear officials and
45to appoint committees of investigation.
Thus, it is obvious that the Assembly of WEU has
attempted to develop its areas of competence and powers of
action to a much greater degree than it would appear the
designers of this body had envisioned.
Whether these actions on the part of the Assembly
served the best interest of the organisation as a whole in
view of its goals as laid down in the Paris Agreements is
certainly open to debate. There is certainly a direct con-
nection between the Assembly's attempts to justify and
carry out its own view of its powers and the lack of sup-
port the organization has received from the member govern-
ments. If the Assembly had been more docile and acquiescent
toward the Council's admonitions concerning the Assembly's
range of power, perhaps the Assembly would have been more
readily accepted by the member 3tatss; however, such an
occurrence seems to have been highly unlikely. The fact
that the member &t lid not feel it to be in their inter-
ests to make WEU a broiler and more powerful organization,
coupled with the diverting of the integrationlsts ' efforts
toward the Common I'^arket, certainly supports this view.















It would appear logical then that, if the Assembly had not
been adamant in its attempts to secure a broader role for
itself, it would have been relegated to an even remoter
position among the European organizations than it has en-
joyed. Furthermore, by continuing to work for what it con-
sidered its proper role to be, the Assembly has contributed
significantly to the cause of European integration both in
the political and military spheres. Because of the environ-
ment in which it has operated and because a consensus for
rapid movement toward integration has been lacking, the WEU
has not been a spectacular success; however, its experiences
can prove invaluable in the years ahead.
In addition to the Council (described in supra , p.
21 ££. passim ) and the Assembly, there are two subsidiary
agencies of the Council, the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments and the Standing Armaments Committee, which should be
examined briefly for a better understanding of the total
effort of the organization. As provided for in Protocol IV,
the Agency for the Control of Armaments was established by
the Council during the first working session of the Council
in May, 1955, and it commenced operations on June 21, 1955.
The tasks of the organization as laid down in Article VII
of Protocol IV are:
(a) to satisfy itself that the undertaking set out
in Protocol III not to manufacture certain types of
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armaments mentioned in Annexes II and III to that
Protocol are being observed.
(b) to control in accordance with Part III of the
present Protocol the level of stocks of armaments of
the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol III held
by each member of Western European Union on the main-
land of Europe. This control shall extend to produc-
tion and imports to the extent required to make the
control of stocks effective*
Thus, the main tasks are to ensure the undertaking of the
Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain
items is observed and to control the level of stocks of the
listed items held by each member of the WEU on the Conti-
nent. To assist the Agency in carrying out its duties,
each member is required to submit to the Agency an annual
report of the total quantities of armaments required for
Its forces on the Continent under NATO authority and the
current levels of such armaments.
In addition to the documentary material provided by
the member governments, the Agency further obtains informa-
tion from field inspections it conducts at military installa-
tions under NATO command (or forces earmarked for NATO) on
the Continent and at armaments production facilities on the
Continent. Although the Agency has done a commendable Job
in the areas in which it has been allowed to operate, it
has never been accorded full inspection rights, nor has it
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One difficulty with which the Agency has had to con-
tend is the decision by the member states to consider the
level of armaments fixed in the Paris Agreements as apply-
ing only to those armaments under NATO command. In its
report to the Assembly in June of 1960, the Council de-
scribed the activities of the Agency for the previous year
46
as follows: on the one hand, continued control of con-
ventional armaments using the methods developed during pre-
vious years? while, on the other hand, a continued inability
to exercise real or complete control in certain sectors
since two important legal instruments had not come into
force. The legal instruments referred to, which were signed
in Paris in 1957 and were still not operable in 1965, will
expand the Agency 1 s area of control to include all internal
defense and police forces and will facilitate the Agency's
dealings with private manufacturers in the armamants field.
Despite the fact that the WEU is given a primary
function of ensuring that force levels agreed upon in the
Treaty are not exceeded, another of its main problems has
been one of trying to encourage the member states to build
up their forces to the agreed-upon levels. Great Britain,
in particular, is a prime example of a member state decid-
ing unilaterally to reduce its forces on the Continent
46
Document 159, Proceedings , June, 1960, p, 19.
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(will be more fully discussed later). To complement
British actions, France has been continually guilty of us-
ing legal loopholes to avoid subjecting some of its forces
to WEU scrutiny, France, initially, claimed her atomic
bombs were being made for experimental purposes and were
not for "production"; therefore, they did not come under
the Treaty, Since France has definitely moved into the
"production" stage, she has refused to submit to the Coun-
47
cil's judgment with respect to levels of nuclear weapons.
For obvious political and military reasons, the only
member state which has consented to fairly rigid applica-
tion of the Treaty provisions is the Federal Republic of
Germany. Although, in Germany's case, restrictions have
been relaxed in order to allow her to build larger sub-
marines as recommended by SACEUR.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it would appear
that the Agency has met with only partial success which is
quite correct; however, this does not detract from the con-
tributions made by the Agency in the field of arms control.
The effective operation of WEU's functions is directly re-
lated to the amount of political consensus existing in the
member states. Considering the amount of consensus WEU
A "7
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has had in the field of arms control, it has done a credit-
able Job in this field, particularly with respect to con-
ventional weapons. The consensus among the member states
is growing, as is evidenced by the fact that of the legal
instruments needed for more effective operation of the
Agency mentioned earlier—one was completely ratified by
late 1964 and the other lacked only two states' consent.
The experience gained by WEU in the field of arms
control will certainly be invaluable to any further move-
ment in that field on the global scale. A global system
would certainly have to differ in many ways from that of
WEU, but the groundwork done in WEU can provide relevant
information in a field where it is desperately needed. WEU
has been able to s^ow, on a very limited scale (considering
the sectors they have been able to operate in), that arms
control is not impossible in today's complex world.
The primary function of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee is to increase the level of common production of
waapons and to promote the standardization of weapons used
by the member states. Because of WEU's relationship with
NATO and the attempts of the NATO Organization to promote
standardization and common production of weapons throughout
the Alliance, WEU's work in this area has been logically
overshadowed by NATO. There have been suggestions from the
United States to merge the WEU Committee with NATO because
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the United States does not like the idea of negotiations on
common production of weapons to which it is not a party.
The WEU, however, has not seen fit to make such a move al-
though it does work very closely with its NATO counterpart.
The concept for a committee of this kind was first
introduced by the French government during the London Con-
ference. France submitted a draft directive on the produc-
tion and standardization of armaments which sought to
establish common standards for the armaments of the partici-
pating countries* The idea received a favorable reception
and later during the Paris Conference, a resolution to con-
vene a Working Group to study Agreements. A favorable
recommendation from the Working Group to the Council re-
sulted in that body's decision to establish a Standing
49Armaments Committee,
The motivation for the original French proposal and
the consensus it gathered from the other members of WEU
came primarily from two sources. First was a general
belief that standardization was a justified and worthwhile
goal in itself. The second source, and no doubt the primary
one in the minds of the French government, was desire to
impose even tighter restrictions on German rearmament. The
48Ibid.
, p. 108,









original French proposal envisaged a sort of "armaments
pool" contributed to and drawn upon by all members but
under the control of a joint body. The actual Committee
which was established was obviously not exactly what the
French had in mind. The Committee's main area of success,
although limited, has been in the field of new equipment.
With regard to older equipment and methods of production,
the Committee found:
• • • that there is little chance of aiming at effi-
cacious joint production of existing equipment. The
producer countries, and even the purchasing countries,
are generally too far committed for any attempt at a
bringing together of a present positions of the dif-
ferent countries to have a reasonable chance of suc-
cess. 51
The use made of the Committee by the member states
has been the subject of continual debate in the Assembly. A
review of the debates held concerning the Council's annual
report on the Committee reveals an annual plea by the Assem-
bly for the member governments to support the work of the
Committee. These pleas, however, have gone unheeded for
the Council's report in 1964 indicated there was nothing
new to report—many of the subcommittees did not even meet
during the year. So long as the member states continue to
50ibid.
51Document 79, Proceedings , Fourth Session, April,
1958.
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conduct their negotiations on standardization in bilateral
or multilateral negotiations outside WEU, the prospects of
the Committee becoming an important and effective body are
remote. If, however, there is significant movement toward
integration on a broader scale in Western Europe (i.e.,
Great Britain's becoming a full member of the Community
Organization), then the Standing Armaments Committee may
enjoy a new importance.
lM
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CHAPTER III
THE ROLE OF WEU IN WESTERN DEFENSE
As laid down in the legal documents which created it,
the WEU was given a primary function in the field of Western
defense and secondary functions in the areas of economic,
social, and cultural cooperation. In addition, WEU was to
provide a solution to the Saar problem. Gradually and very
logically, WEU has given up its legal claim to act in the
fields of its secondary functions, and it has turned over
any work started in these areas to other European organiza-
tions more logically equipped to handle these functions.
The successful solution of the Saar problem outside
the WEU framework in 1955 was one of the first losses suf-
fered by the WEU. The ownership and control of the Saar
had been a constant source of friction in Franco-German
relations for many years; and, as a result, the French
Parliament laid down as one of its conditions for approving
German rearmament that a mutually-agreeable solution be
found for the Saar. An agreement was worked out between
France and Germany under which, subject to a Saar referen-
dum, the Saar was to be "Europeanized" within the framework
of the WEU. The people of the Saar, however, felt dif-
ferently and rejected the WEU solution in favor of incor-
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West Germany by a Franco-German agreement on January 1,
1957, thus ended WEU responsibility with respect to the
Saar.
The main reason the WEU was given responsibility in
the cultural and social areas is that these functions were
inherited from the Brussels Treaty Organization. The logic
in passing on these areas of responsibility to the WEU
seems a little faulty today, considering the activities of
organizations such as the Council of Europe. No doubt the
programs of the BTO in operation in 1954 supplied the main
rationale for passing the functions on to WEU, in spite of
the excellent opportunity presented for a further clarify-
ing of the primary roles the various European organizations
should have been playing. But the members of the new WEU
Assembly, being anxious both firmly to establish the organi-
zation on as broad a front as possible and certainly wish-
ing to fulfill the terms of the Treaty creating WEU,
rapidly established WEU committees for the cultural and
social areas to carry on the work of the BTO. WEU's work
in these fields lasted approximately five years, during
which the Council of Europe and others were constantly
decrying the duplication of effort which was being created
M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Move-
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by WEU's continued activity in these areas. Although the
WEU's work in the cultural and social areas was certainly a
genuine contribution to the total European effort, logic
finally prevailed in 1960 when the Assembly consented to
transfer its operations in these fields to the Council of
Europe, That the transfer took so long to occur is cer-
tainly a (dubious) credit to the "literalists" in the
Assembly who consistently blocked such action in the early
years. That the transfer was logical and necessary to re-
duce duplication of effort is certainly readily apparent.
However, to use these reductions in functional responsibility
as evidence that the WEU has become an organization without
a real constructive purpose is to overlook the fact that
the primary function assigned to WEU in the field of Western
defense still exists and will probably grow more important
in the future.
This is not meant to suggest that WEU's role in
Western defense has been readily agreed upon or accepted by
the member governments because quite the opposite is true.
The most difficult problem the WEU has had to contend with
has been that of establishing its area of competence in the
field of Western defense to the satisfaction of the member
governments.
The fact that the seven members of WEU are also mem-
bers of NATO has certainly made the job of exactly defining
a .£w 8S»is e '.jri.G lav 7W «*Qm
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WEU's role much more complex. Clearly, in the broad con-
text of Western defense, NATO is the more powerful and more
meaningful organization and the WEU is a less competent
organization, which represents the views of only a seven
member unit within the total NATO framework. The relation-
ship between the WEU and NATO is necessarily complex be-
cause the two organizations have the same general goals and
yet there is not a legal superior-inferior ordering. The
obvious result and natural danger in having two inter-
governmental defense organizations operating in the same
general area is overlapping of functions and areas of opera-
tion. The dominant trend in the resolution of the problem
of overlapping and/or duplication of effort with respect to
the WEU and NATO has been one of the former relinquishing
responsibility to the latter in those areas where the
broader Western Alliance interests of the member states are
best served. Basically, this has meant that WEU has gra-
dually relinquished cognizance over certain strictly-
operational military functions to NATO. As a result, WEU,
as a defense organization, has no troops at its disposal,
but this situation has not meant that the organization con-
siders its role in the field of Western defense to have been
invalidated.
The problem of determining the role of WEU in the
field of Western defense to the satisfaction of the member
•£AX. ;
<






states has been the source of a continuing running debate
in the Assembly since its opening session. The general
legal basis for the WEU's role is laid down in the follow-
ing sections of the amended Brussels Treaty. The Preamble
states: "Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty
for collaboration in economic, social, cultural matters,
and for collective self defense." Article VIII goes on to
state: "For the purposes of strengthening peace and
security and of promoting unity the High Contracting Parties
shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the
execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols, and Annexes."
The Article then goes on to describe the functions of the
Council, including the phrase which established the Assembly,
and the guidelines for the Council in the event of a threat
to the peace.
Recognizing that problems of overlap would exist by
the very creation of a defense organization among seven
members of the larger NATO organization, Article IV of the
Treaty provides that "in execution of the Treaty the High
Contracting Parties and any organs established by them,
shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization." Also, Article IV provides that:
"Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the Military
Staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the
appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information
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and advice on military matters," It was within these
declarations of purpose and the qualifying sections per-
taining to NATO that the broad function of WEU in the area
of Western European defense was to be established.
The problem of defining that function was among the
first on the working agenda of the Assembly after WEU's
formation. In 1956, the rapporteur of the Assembly's Com-
mittee on Defense Questions and Armaments gave a careful
explanation of the problem and described the two predomi-
nant points of view on the problem which existed within the
Assembly, The accepted Assembly view according to the
rapporteur was that:
Western European Union forms the European political
group, which in military terms becomes a European
nucleus within NATO, The difficulty is to spell out
exactly in practical terms just what this phrase
"European nucleus" means in relation to NATO,
2
He then went on to describe the two points of view existing
with regard to this definition.
The first group the rapporteur described as the
"minimalists" because they interpreted WEU's role to be
restricted to responsibility for the Armaments Control
Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee, This group
considered that NATO has the practical responsibility for
2,Document 28 in Proceedings of tl»e Assembly of The
Western European Union , Second Session, October, 19*^5',""
p, 11, {.Hereafter referred to as Proceedings . ]









the organization of the defense of all Member States, in-
cluding the seven Member States of WEU, in the widest sense,
concerning strategic and tactical organization, agreement
on troop commitments, etc.
The opposing view, termed the "maximalist" by the
rapporteur, gave much more weight and significance to the
phrase, "European nucleus." This group considered that WEU
should have a much broader jurisdiction in defense matters
because of the greater commitments to "collective self
defense" in the Brussels Treaty than contained in Article V
of the NATO Treaty. In addition, this group felt their
stand was supported by the longer duration of the commit-
ment incurred in the Brussels Treaty and in the political
area that one of the objectives of the organization was "to
promote the unity and to encourage the progressive inte-
3gration of Europe."
It is quite evident from the report of the Committee
on Defense Questions and Armaments and from the comments of
the rapporteur that the maximalists held a firm hold on that
Committee. The rapporteur in further clarification of the
maximalist position went on to explain that the maximalists
did not advocate duplication of the NATO common structure
nor did they feel that collective representation of WEU in
3Ibid.
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NATO was a practical goal. What they did want was recogni-
tion of WEU's right to a role of broad jurisdiction on
European defense questions. The opinion of the Committee
was that, as the one international parliamentary body with
any jurisdiction at all over questions concerning the
defense of the West, the Assembly of the WEU had a right to
expect that it be kept fully informed on defense matters.
In the conclusions to their report to the Assembly,
dated April 17, 1956, the Committee requested the Council:
... not to take too restrictive a view about its
(the Assembly) relative competence with regard to
NATO. Prom the point of view of the Governments it
is clearly right and practical that their general
responsibility for security should be discharged
through NATO. But this does not mean that they
should not communicate to the only parliamentary
Assembly competent in this field information con-
cerning their activities within NATO, since they
are in fact responsible to seven national parlia-
ments and the members of our Assembly are chosen
from those parliaments. What must be avoided at all
costs is any narrow legalistic argument. By virtue
of the Brussels Treaty we are competent to discuss
these grave problems; we can do so only if we are
properly informed; and if we discuss the issues in
common, in a European Assembly, this forms a valu-
able corrective to the tendency in all national
parliaments to look at plans involving considerable
sacrifice solely from a point of view of immediate
national advantage, rather than in the perspective
of European security as a whole. 4
The Council, however, was not ready then, nor would
it be in the years that followed, to endorse the Assembly*
s
Document 12 in Proceedings , Second Session, April,
1957, p. 71.
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view that it should have complete access to all NATO infor-
mation relevant to the seven Member States, The result was
that the Assembly received a minimal amount of Information
(only unclassified) from NATO.
The Assembly's dissatisfaction with the kind and
amount of information on defense matters submitted to it
continued, and the result was a series of repeated demands
to the Council for more information. In a lateral move,
the Assembly invited the Defense Ministers of the Seven to
attend the October, 1956, session of the Assembly. The
Council viewed such an appearance as unwarranted and unwise;
5
and, as a result, the Defense Ministers did not attend.
As it became evident that the Council felt it could not
change its stand on the question of supplying more informa-
tion to the Assembly, a general theme of acute frustration
with the situation appeared in the general debate held.
One member of the Assembly, voicing the sentiments of many,
questioned: "Is Western European Union therefore to be
denied the opportunity of discussing what I consider to be
the most important reason of all for the bringing into ex-
istence of Western European Union? • • • • I may be quite
wrong, but my impression was that the establishment of
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providing a Parliamentary Assembly to discuss and to debate
problems of defense," He went on to say that, if the
Council thought the only activity appropriate for the
Assembly was the discussion of social and cultural matters,
then one of two courses should be taken: either amend the
Treaty specifically to provide the Assembly with the infor-
mation it considered necessary, or dissolve the Assembly
altogether,
Mr. Beyen, representing the Council, answered the
maximalists' arguments in the following manner:
The special character of the relations between the
Council of Ministers and the Assembly derives from
the character of the Council of Ministers as defined
by the Treaty, Neither the Council nor the Assembly
can change that character; it is only by changing
the Treaty that it can be altered,
• • • whatever the difficulties the Assembly finds
in its relationship with the Council of Ministers,
it should not start by thinking they are due to a
lack of consideration or to evasive tactics. They
are, I would say, in almost all cases due to the
fact that the Council of Ministers is not a respon-
sible body towards you.'
The debate ended with the adoption of Recommendation
Six presented by the Defense Committee which urged that the
Council urgently review their present interpretation of the
amended Treaty of Brussels with regard to the functions of
QWestern European Union in the defense field.












The Council's answer to the Assembly's recommenda-
tion and their urgent demands came in the Second Annual
Report of the Council of the Assembly in the spring of 1957.
In the report, the Council recognized the legitimacy of the
Assembly's demand for defense information which it was en-
titled to and the strength and determination of the Assembly
to consider those broader aspects of defense policy which
the Council still considered beyond its Jurisdiction. The
Council conceded that it had an obligation to furnish that
information within the realm of the Assembly's jurisdiction.
It further advocated more Joint meetings between the Council
and committee representatives from the Assembly. The
Council's opinion with regard to the function of WEU in the
defense field, however, had not changed. The Council felt
that, although certain military tasks had been assigned to
WEU under the Paris Agreements, "no steps were taken to re-
establish military planning or command machinery as a part
of WEU." The view of the Council was that the Paris Agree-
ments "demonstrate that the seven WEU Powers considered that
their mutual defense obligations could and should be ful-
filled through NATO." Therefore, the WEU governments con-
sider that the activities of the Council in the field of
defense questions and armaments relate to:
(a) matters which the Contracting Parties wish to
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(b) the level of forces of member states (Protocol
ID,
(c) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces
or the Continent,
(d) the Agency for the Control of Armaments,
(e) the Standing Armaments Committee,
i
While the Council felt unable to provide information
beyond that pertaining to the five areas listed, it did
suggest that other information desired might best be ob-
tained from the national parliaments of the member states.
The Assembly accepted the suggestion as a possible solution
to the problem and, in turn, made the following formal rec-
ommendation to the Council:
That it communicate, beginning on September 1, 195 7 to
the Assembly on the first day of every second month
the text of information concerning defense matters
communicated by the Governments of the seven Member
States to their national Parliaments and to the Com-
mittees of those Parliaments, in accordance with the
provisions of Article VII (e) of the Charter, 10
Although this plan was implemented later and initially
appeared to soothe the frustrations of the Assembly, the
calm was again broken on the subject by the Assembly in
October, 1957, shortly after the Russian success with Sput-
nik, In a series of resolutions, the Assembly again took
the offensive in recommending courses of action for Western
policy to the Council. The Assembly's dissatisfaction
g















resulted in a recommendation to the Council that in the
future it shall carry out fully the responsibilities which
are imposed by the Treaty and make full report thereon to
the Assembly. The Assembly further requested the Council's
opinion on the following proposal:
That the Governments of the member states of Western
European Union entrust their Permanent Representa-
tives to NATO, acting as representatives of their
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, vith the mission of
keeping the Committee on Defense Questions and Arma-
ments informed concerning developments in those
sectors where the WEU Council has at present trans-
ferred its functions to NATO. 1*
The Council again felt unable to accept the Assem-
bly's proposed solution, but it did provide an alternate
solution after consultation with the North Atlantic Council
13
on the subject.
An excellent example of the continuing attempts of
the Assembly to play a meaningful role in the field of
European defense concerns the British government's request
to reduce the number of British military forces stationed
on the Continent. By the spring and summer of 1956, the
British government was seriously considering a general
12Recommendation 18, Proceedings , Third Session,
October, 1957, p. 324.
13Proceedings , Fourth Session, July, 1958, pp. 24-
25. This section of the Third Annual Report describes the
Council's attempts to solve the problem.
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reduction and reorganization of her military forces. The
advent of the hydrogen bomb and apparent nuclear stalemate
between the United States and the Soviet Union gave support
to the growing conviction that no nation would be foolhardy
enough to risk nuclear war. Beginning in 1954, the United
States had been talking about force reduction and the equip-
ping of NATO with tactical nuclear weapons. By 1956, U. S.
defense planning appeared to have progressed to the stage
where actual large-scale reductions of U. S. forces were
contemplated. There were press reports on Admiral Radford's
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) proposal to reduce
the existing U. S. forces from about 2,800,000 to 2,000,000
by 1960. Sources familiar with Admiral Radford »s concept
and views said Army forces overseas , including the five
NATO divisions would be reduced to "small token forces."
During the same period, the new Soviet policy of
"peaceful coexistence" was being promoted with vigor by the
Soviet Union. On May 14, 1956, the Soviet government an-
nounced that, in the absence of an agreement on general
disarmament, they would unilaterally cut their armed forces
by 1,200,000 men by May 1, 195 7. 16 The British declaration,
i 4
* Ball, op_. clt . , p. 94.
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in this period when the two major powers felt they could
afford to reduce the size of their military establishments,
was an announcement on May 17, 195S, that Great Britain
would reduce her armed forces from 772,000 to 700,000. By
the end of July, a full-dress debate was held in the House
of Commons covering such topics as replacing conscription
with a smaller regular army and seeking additional ways to
bring about substantial reductions in defense expenditures.
By the beginning of 1957, the British proposals for a sub-
stantial force reduction had solidified to the point where
the Government felt it necessary to consult with its WEU
17partners about the matter.
On February 27, 195 7, British Foreign Secretary
Selwyn presented the British proposals in the WEU Council;
a meeting which was attended by SACEUR, the United States
and Canada, in addition to the member states, Mr. Lloyd
emphasized the fact that the proposed reductions were pri-
marily designed to improve the fighting capacity of Great
Britain rather than decrease it. The only real decision
made by the Council at the meeting was to postpone further
discussion on the matter until after it had been presented
18
to and discussed by the NATO Council, During March, the














On March 18, the WEU Council again took up its consideration
of the subject. Both in the wider membership of NATO and
among the members of WETj
,
there appeared to be a consider-
able difference of view as to the wisdom of increased
reliance on atomic weapons accompanied by a reduction of
conventional forces. General Norstad, SACEUR, had clearly
stated previously that he was opposed to any reduction of
NATO forces below the thirty division level agreed upon.
Therefore, it is doubtful he added any favorable support
19for the British proposals.
West Germany was particularly concerned about the
prospect of the proposed British and probable American re-
duction of forces on the Continent and the fact that she
was still expected to furnish NATO with twelve divisions.
Reaction in the Bundestag was very strong against the pro-
posed reductions; in addition to the segment who felt that
reunification of Germany had been seriously prejudiced by
German membership in NATO, there now existed a group who
felt it unjust that Germany should be demanded to furnish
twelve divisions while other members of NATO were consider-
ing force reductions. One result of this atmosphere was a
decision by Chancellor Adenauer to reduce the term of
19Ibid.







German conscription from eighteen to twelve months in a
20bill he was attempting to have the legislature pass.
The decisions of the WEU Council on the matter of the
British request were presented to the WEU Assembly in the
following form:
The Council recognized that the problems facing the
United Kingdom were, in fact, common to all members
of the Alliance and that these common problems
called for a common solution within NATO. The
seven Governments therefore agreed to recommend to
the North Atlantic Council that they study urgently
the proposals made by the German Chancellor for a
new overall review of the resources of the Alliance
covering:
(a) military requirements and defense aims;
(b) relationship between conventional and atomic
forces and weapons;
(c) relationship between modern armaments and
economic and financial resources;
(d) common production of modern weapons;
(e) common solution of currency problems arising
from the stationing of troops in member
states. 21
In addition, the Council also agreed the British government,
"pending the result of this review by NATO, would carry out
that part of their plans which related to the Financial
22
Year 1957-1958 . . . . " In effect, the reduction granted
Great Britain amounted to a decrease of 13,500 men who were
stationed in Germany. The forces which would be withdrawn
20Ibid.
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from Germany were described as primarily administrative and
anti-aircraft personnel which, as described by the Council,
would raise the overall percentage of fighting units in
Germany. The four divisional organizational structure of
British Army units was to be maintained, and the total
number of British aircraft in Germany was to be halved.
However, the fire power of those remaining was to be in-
creased with atomic weapons. The Ministers also agreed
that any further decisions on the subject would be taken in
October, 1957, after new discussions in WEU.
In the autumn of 1956, various members of the Assem-
bly had begun to express their concern about the impending
trend of troop reductions in Europe. In October, 1956,
after calling for a review of defense requirements necessi-
tated by the new weapons the Assembly recommended to the
Council "that it be accepted that substantial conventional
23forces be retained in order to meet all eventualities."
In its Second Annual Report to the Assembly, the Council
supported the recommendation as follows: "All member
governments of WEU are, however, agreed that, whatever the
final pattern of Western defense forces, substantial conven-
24
tional forces must be maintained." However, in spite of
23Document 28, Proceedings , Second Session, October,
1956, Vol. Ill, p. 108.
Document 37, Proceedings , Third Session, May, 1957,
Vol. II.
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the apparent agreement between the two bodies, the action
of the Council in giving its approval to the British re-
quest came under severe attack by the Assembly.
In a report presented to the Assembly on March 27,
1957, the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments,
after pointing out that it had not been consulted during
the weeks of negotiation on the British request, insisted
that:
1, That the effective defence of Western Europe on
the basis of forward strategy requires:
(a) an irreducible minimum land force of 30
divisions equipped with tactical atomic weapons;
(b) a strategic nuclear striking force;
2. that a reduction of the still too weak ground
forces at present stationed on the Continent of
Europe would destroy the essence of the Western
European defensive system, and is therefore not
acceptable. 25
The extreme dissatisfaction of the Assembly with the Coun-
cil's action in this matter led to the presentation of the
Assembly* s first motion to disagree. While the final vote
on the motion was thirty-one to twenty-seven with ten ab-
stentions, thus failing to obtain the required absolute
majority, the very introduction of the motion is indicative
of the strong feelings of some members of the Assembly as
to their rights and prerogatives with regard to questions
25Document 38, Proceedings , Third Session, May, 1957,






of European defense. The following portions of that motion
reflect the feelings of a substantial number of the Assem-
bly's members,
[The Assembly] ... considering that the Council gave
its approval before the consequences of the reduction
of British forces had been sufficiently studied, and
without adequately taking into account the provisions
of Article 6 of Protocol II of the amended Brussels
Treaty
Expressing its deep concern at the fact that European
security is weakened by reducing defence forces which
are already inadequate;
Considers insufficient the content of the Supplement
to the Annual Report of the Council, and refers it
back to be reexamined and a new report to be made to
the Assembly. 26
In this initial test of the Assembly's competence in
defense matters, it was readily apparent that the member
states were not going to be bound to nor controlled by the
inter-governmental parliamentary body of the WEU. Great
Britain's views with respect to her obligations toward the
WEU were clarified further by the British White Paper of
195 7, which was published without previously informing the
27Council of WEU. The paper contained the outline of a
revolutionary new defense policy for Great Britain which
included the abolition of conscription in Great Britain in
















addition to major reductions in the levels of her armed
forces* The whole document was based on the conviction
that any new war would be a nuclear war, that there was no
real "means of providing adequate protection for the people
of Britain against the consequences of an attack by nuclear
weapons • • • • "
The Council's relative acquiescence in acknowledging
the new British policy and that policy's implications con-
cerning future requests by Great Britain to reduce her
troops on the Continent was not received favorably by the
Assembly. The Assembly's dissatisfaction stemmed from two
major points. First, it was felt that the Assembly had
bean handed a "fait accompli" with respect to the question,
thereby ignoring the prerogatives the Assembly felt it
should enjoy in the field of European defense. Secondly,
there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with the wisdom
of the generally accepted plan for troop reductions and
specifically with the British plans which the Council had
approved. In spite of the Assembly's feelings on the mat-
ter, the reduction of British forces to 64,500 was effected,
Later, in January, 1958, the Council agreed to a second
reduction of British forces on the Continent to a level of
55,000 men to be accomplished in the fiscal year 1959.28
28 European Yearbook (The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff
,
1960), Vol. VT£, p. 175.
mht^nn i*<l in «lt5v*ii «ftt tot*" oi fl
>1vmoo t >4U»ti a*w inaawnnfr fci
on aa*f tudi **fti f*av iMmlum a a* blue* ?aw w*a vrta *aatt
#ZC**4 aril-
oa \q aaawaupaanoa1 arid }*nl&%t>
oalwototea til aona»aavUjps* avlialai a'lJtaaaJoO arfr
«« wart ftdi
^*>r: mmtbmt oj abaiiifl i*»^c *d aiaaupa* • pnJLniao
owl oc iaaaJtb a* .v
iawaaA i ion lolmm
adt o* dseqaau kiss* $1 jbnatf jiaad
t03;?£ «aanalf>b oaoqoiuS aorta
—»«jai iff: « ;.l* .i.i'.f... IrtJ t*ciib *J L*a+ **#1| i MW aaarf*
h«a ajfoiievbas qooatf joi Aalq toiqc^a*. lanoo. e
* art* .toJLrtw aoai loaqe
i*.« art* no abulia. . : a v
.•w 002, *d *>-* seo:so* Jla
?o**a a i*iaJ
to !•¥•! a o* JnaaU^acO »ri2 ad aaaaol rial




The actions of Great Britain with respect to her
troop commitments to Europe affords an excellent example of
the dilemma presented to the Assembly of the WEU. Although
the organization is given the function of supervising force
levels of the member states, the unilateral decisions of the
member states with respect to those levels has obviated any
real measure of supervisory control by the organization.
Great Britain is certainly not the only member who has ig-
nored the WEU in defense matters, France's actions with
respect to her nuclear forces provides a more serious breach
of promise as agreed to under the amended Brussels Treaty,
Almost since the establishment of WEU, France has continu-
ally circumvented the supervisory role envisioned for the
WEU. Without support by the larger member states, it is
quite clear why the attempts of the Assembly to establish
an acknowledged competence in the area of European defense
have not been highly successful.
Yet, in spite of the lack of support the member
states have given to the organization, the Assembly has
continued the fight to establish its role by two general
approaches. First, there have been annual appeals by the
Assembly for the member governments to make use of and to
acknowledge the WEU as an effective defense organization.
Each non-concurrence by the Council to the continual Assem-
bly demands for more information on defense matters and for







a real recognition of their existence has resulted in stormy
debates between Assembly members and the representatives of
the Council. Secondly, within the bounds of the role the
member states have been willing to grant the WEU, it has
done a commendable Job of providing the public forum for
debate of general defense subjects.
In 1962 , the Defense Committee of the Assembly pub-
lished a report entitled "State of European Security 1956-
1961," which describes in great detail the activities of
29the Assembly in the area of European defense. The report
offers substantial evidence that, in spite of the narrow
role it has been assigned by the member states, the WEU is
performing an important function in European defense. The
Assembly has been addressed in open session by many of the
leading political and military figures in European organi-
zations. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), both
in the person of General Norstad and of General Leranitzer,
has been almost an annual guest speaker. In addition, the
Secretary General of NATO and the Defense Ministers from
the member states have appeared before the Assembly. Fol-
lowing many of the open sessions , these key people in
29
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European defense have consented to appear in closed ses-
sions in order to discuss some of the more delicate problems.
The Defense Committee itself has been a most active
element within the Assembly as it has sought to provide the
entire body with expert analysis and organization of the
information to which it has access. The Committee members
have conducted numerous inspection tours of major defense
installations throughout the seven country area. These
visits, plus the information the member states have been
willing to provide have given the Committee the material
necessary for discussion of common European problems.
These discussions and debates have led to the criticisms
and constant recommendations by the Assembly addressed to
the Council and the member governments.
At the conclusion of its lengthy report on European
security in 1961, the Defense Committee, as it had done
many times before, offered a series of recommended policies
it felt necessary to enhance that security. The Assembly,
after debating the report at length, accepted the general
recommendations of the Defense Committee and forwarded them
to the Council and the member governments. The points in
the Recommendation were:
1. That the member governments bring up their armed







2, That more progress should be made in the stand-
ardization of weapons and common production of
armaments,
3, That NATO should be asked to revise its rulings
on the provision of only unclassified informa-
tion to the Defi;nre "omraittee.
None of these recommendation? were new because each
of them had appeared continually in the recommendations
coming from the semi-annual meetings of the Assembly prior
to 1961; and owing to the peculiar environment WEU was
operating in, each would continue to appear after 1961, The
central theme of the Defense Committee's report was that if
the members of the Western Alliance were willing to abandon
"nationalistic concepts of defence in favor of common
defence* and if that common defense was effectively "super-
vised by national and international parliamentary bodies,"
then the existing deficiencies in the Western defense sys-
tem could be eliminated. The logic in this central theme
is difficult to question if, in fact, the member states
were still pursuing the goal of the best possible defense
system in the face of a commonly-perceived danger and per-
haps even more relevant—if the political consensus neces-
sary for such additional losses of sovereignty were present.
Such was not the case in 1961 when the Council, and
later the member governments, received the Assembly's recom-
mendations and no major change has taken place since. One
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establishing its role in defense matter, and it is a key
factor in understanding WEU*s general non use, is the fact
that the creation of WEU coincided with the strengthening
of the "community" movement of the Six in the mid-1950* s.
This factor, coupled with the British attitude toward the
Six in the 1950' s, the divergent French-American views on
European defense, and the perceived lessening of the Soviet
threat, have all contributed significantly to the WEU's
dilemma. The caliber of WEU's work has been high in the
field of European defense even if limited. According to a
noted observer of the European scene, Mr, Kenneth Lindsay,
• • • the successive reports of the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments have been of a high standard;
they have done a public service of exposing the weak-
nesses of NATO and in recording a disappointing lack
of progress on armaments control in WEU. 30
While conditions have not existed which would have allowed
WEU to play a broader role in European defense, it has con-
tributed significantly to the extent it has been allowed by
the member governments. Its primary contribution in the
broad sense has been to provide a public forum in which
European defense matters can be discussed in a truly demo-
cratic manner. Although the Assembly is only able to
recommend and has no real parliamentary control over
30Kenneth Lindsay, European Assemblies (New York:







European defense, it has provided valuable experience to-
ward developing a "European sense of responsibility,
And, as will be discussed in the last chapter, there
are certain definite indications that the conditions which
have prevented WEU from playing an influential role in
European defenses are slowly changing. There exists the
distinct possibility that the WEU may well become the
European defense organization if the divisive tendencies in
the NATO Alliance continue.
13 ^H
CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF WEU
In the preamble to the amended Brussels Treaty, the
authors of the Treaty had declared their resolve:
To promote the unity and to encourage the pro-
gressive integration of Europe.
It is from the Assembly's interpretation of this charge
that the second broad area of the Assembly's activities
have evolved—the attempt to create a political role for
the WEU. One of the key questions which perplexed the first
meetings of the WEU Assembly was the extent and nature of
the political role envisioned for the Assembly by the
authors of the treaties establishing the WEU. The question
was one which had no simple answers. The Representatives
could not easily discover what useful political role the
new seven power organisation could play in view of the
broader organizations such as NATO and the Council of
Europe, which were already in existence, and the vagueness
of the treaties with respect to the matter.
Despite any clear-cut statutory basis, the Represen-
tatives did decide that the intent of the authors of the
Treaty had envisioned a useful political role for the Assem-
bly. Their rationale in making such a decision seem3 to
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although the primary role of the Assembly was to provide
parliamentary supervision for the defense activities of the
member states that role would be encumbered by nationalistic
attitudes the member states would exhibit toward extra
national control. This prediction was both logical, con-
sidering the prevailing feelings about multilateral defense
commitments in the mid-1950' s, and, as has been discussed in
Chapter II, the prediction was essentially correct. The
second assumption tended to flow from the logic of the
first, in that, if the Assembly's role in the defense area
was going to be restricted to a degree, considering the
inter-governmental nature of the organization, then the
authors must have envisioned other additional duties for
the Assembly.
Evidence to back the Assembly's reasoning on the
matter was offered by Mr. Pierre Mendes-France, the French
Prime Minister, in a speech before the National Assembly
during the debate on ratification of the Paris Agreements.
During that speech, he made the following statement:
Moreover, Western European Union is not competent,
as is too often thought, in the military field
alone: it is also competent in other and highly
diversified fields—those of economics, commerce,
"hpaul Borcier, The Political Role of the Assembly of
WEU (Paris: WEU Information Booklet, 19617, p. "57"
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and social questions—and its powers will be pro-
gressively extended if only by the pressure of the
democratic assembly which is to be set up with it.
2
The French Prime Minister's observations certainly
implied that the role envisioned for the Assembly was one
of an expanding nature—depending primarily on the initia-
tive of the membership of the Assembly, He went on to
observe:
The contribution to the construction of Europe is
infinitely more important to the future of our
civilization than the military clauses of the
agreements which are now before you.
3
These comments by Mr. Mendes-France and the simi-
larly optimistic statements of other European leaders con-
cerning the potential role of the Assembly certainly
strengthened the position of Assembly members who felt the
Assembly must conduct an exhaustive search for its place in
European affairs. The key phrase upon which the Assembly
attempted to establish a significant political role for it-
self was that which called for the "adoption of the neces-
sary measures to promote the unity and encourage the
progressive integration of Europe." The fact that Great
Britain had made a historic move toward the Continent under
the terms of the Treaty by agreeing to maintain forces on
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of a perceived revival of the European integration movement.
In many respects, the fate of the Assembly's success in the
broader political context was then directly hinged to the
degree of association Great Britain was to have with the
Six.
The bright hopes of 1954-1956 for the political
future of the Assembly, however, were soon dimmed by im-
portant changes which took place in the integration move-
ment. The decision of the Six to renew their efforts
toward integration by the "sector" approach led to the
signing of the Hague Treaties which established two more
supranational institutions—the Common Market and EURATOM.
Great Britain, having refused the supranational approach
through the ECSC and the EDC, maintained her position in
refusing to accept the invitation to become a full member
of the new organizations. The decision by the Six to shift
back to the "Community approach" to integration and Great
Britain's refusal to change her stand on supranational
association with the Six sounded the death knell for any
hopes of a broad influential political role for the WEU
Assembly.
However, despite the change in support the Assembly
experienced, it has, in fact, played a significant, al-
though not major, political role in Western Europe. The
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questions of political significance for Western Europe even
though much of this fine work went unnoticed or unanswered
by the member governments. The General Affairs Committee
of the Assembly has conscientiously explored the main po-
litical questions which have confronted Western Europe and
has provided the Assembly with outstanding reports upon
which it has based its continual flow of recommendations on
these political issues. Yet, in spite of this effort on
the part of the Assembly to play a meaningful political
role, conditions, much the same as those which have circum-
scribed its efforts in the defense field, have prevented
such an occurrence.
The contributions of the Assembly toward further
European integration and resolution of European political
problems, however, has been significant considering the
role it has been allowed to play by the member governments.
The experience gained by both the parliamentarians who have
sat in the Assembly and the member governments who have
been constantly harassed by recommendations of the Assembly
will certainly form a valuable base upon which the next
level of European integration will be leased. The experi-
ence of the Assembly, considering that it is the one assem-
bly in which the broad political-security questions have














parliamentary body which seems destined to result from the
various plans for rationalization of European assemblies.
There are two particularly significant political
questions which the WEU has had a definite constructive
influence upon. The first of these concerns the "bridge-
building" role assigned to WEU once Great Britain decided
that her long-range national interests dictated a closer
association with the Continent through British membership
in the "Community Organizations" of the Six. The other
central political question in which the WEU has displayed
a constant significant interest as exhibited by the running
debate concerning it in the Assembly, and one which may
result in the partial or total absorption of the WEU by other
organizations, is the question of rationalization or simpli-
fying the complex structure of existing European organiza-
tions.
The prospects for WEU»s political role in Europe
declined steadily from its optimistic heights in 19SS and
early 1956. The attention of the Six was entirely diverted
toward their attempts to create an acceptable expanded form
of economic integration in the shape of a customs union.
Because the negotiations on the Rome Treaties were absorb-
ing much of the energy of the Six and because Great Britain
assumed an opposite position with respect to that movement,
the initial consensus concerning the WEU's prospective role
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was badly split—if not forgotten. Conditions had changed,
and WEU suffered directly because of it. During 1957 and
1958, the political career of the WEU Assembly all but
vanished as far as the rest of Europe was concerned. The
primary political topic which received the attention of the
Assembly was the rationalization of the European organiza-
tion in the technical sense which will be discussed later
in this chapter. Because of the split in its membership
into the Six, plus Great Britain over the establishment of
the Common Market, the Assembly was effectively denied the
chance to play a part in questions of broader European
importance. The year 1959, however, witnessed a gradual
trend toward rapprochement between Great Britain and the
Six and with it a new importance for the Assembly in the
political field. Because Great Britain had been unable to
convert the Six to her concept of a greater European asso-
ciation of thirteen or so nations, she gradually began
searching for ways to narrow the gulf which had grown
between them. The WEU offered the logical place in which
Great Britain could promote her plans for "building a
bridge" between the Six and her own partners in the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA). Great Britain decided then
to use the WEU as the vehicle through which she would at-
tempt to resolve her differences with the Six.





















Great Britain's decision to use WEU was heartily
welcomed by the Assembly, At last, they were in a position
to receive a measure of political recognition. Although
many of the Assembly members were overly optimistic about
the political benefits which would occur to WEU, the
organization was being offered an opportunity to make a
significant contribution to the cause of European integra-
tion. And there would certainly have been some incidental
political status reflected on WEU if she was a prime con-
4tributor toward Great Britain's joining Europe, The
Assembly accepted the challenge in a sense and committed
Itself to its first major political battle in the context
of the role it was allowed to play. This is not to suggest
that without the WEU Great Britain could not have found
ways to bridge the channel and conversely all of WEU's
effort were to of no avail in the final decision—the point
is that this particular set of circumstances offered the
organization a new injection of purpose.
Following the defeat of EDC and the plans for a
European Political Community (EPC) which accompanied it,
and during the same period that WEU was organizing itself,
4Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community
1955-1963 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1964), Chapter VIII. In the chapter, the author
presents a detailed account of the British government's
attempts at "bridge-building."
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the advocates of European unity, under the leadership of
Jean Monnet, again began searching for avenues which would
lead them to their goal. Under Monnet' s vigorous leader-
ship the idea of European unity was given new substance and
direction. The results of Monnet* s work, which led to the
Messina Conference and finally the Rome Treaties, came in
the form of plans for the European Economic Community (EEC),
Great Britain's reaction, however, was much the same as it
had been toward the EC5C and the EDC in that she viewed this
new plan of economic integration devised by the supra-
nationalists of Europe with extreme skepticism. Great
Britain did send an official from the Board of Trade to
represent her at the Messina Conference, but his main pur-
pose was to remind the "continentals" of the dangers which
might result from dividing Europe, An additional task of
the British representative was to inform the Europeans that
if they were again contemplating a venture into supra-
national control they could not expect Whitehall to partici-
pate. In a November meeting of the conference, the
British representative, Mr. Bretherton presented Great
Britain's reasons for her apprehension about the impending
economic venture. First, Great Britain feared any arrange-
ment of the sort being discussed would collide with her
Nora Beloff , The General Says No (Baltimore:











Commonwealth commitments and Great Britain insisted that
any arrangement arrived at in the Community concept must
remain within the framework of the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation (OEEC). That was the last
official appearance of Great Britain at the negotiations
because, after the statement of her position, Great Britain
was no longer invited to the negotiations. Great Britain
had nothing more to do either with the Rome Treaty negotia-
tions from which came the Common Market and Euratom.'"
Shortly after the group of experts from the "Six"
began work on the final draft of the Rome Treaty, Great
Britain suggested that the eighteen members of the OEEC
examine the plans for a free trade area among them. The
"Six" responded with an official request for a delay until
they could finish the business at hand. Less than a year
later, on March 25, 195 7, the historic Treaty of Rome was
signed. The initial British reaction to the establishment
of the Common Market was continued skepticism and complacency.
Whitehall comforted itself with the fact that France and
Italy had failed to honor much less drastic obligations to
liberate trade incurred under the OEEC. Therefore, the
chances of success for the EEC appeared slight in British
7
eyes.
6 Ibid. 7Ibid., p. 75
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The choices open to Great Britain, as stated by Mr,
Alan Lennox Boyd, a leading member of the Conservative
Party, were as follows:
Some six European countries are seriously considering
a customs union. We can do three things: remain
outside, losing rich markets and sources of invest-
ment; go in, in which case we would lose our imperial
preference system; or we can have some association
with it v/hich would give us the best of all worlds.®
In view of their proposals for a free trade area, the
British choice was obviously the last one. As a means to
their end, shortly after the Rome Treaty was signed, Great
Britain sent a special emissary to the Continent with the
task of converting the Europeans to the British concept of
a free trade area. The emissary, Mr. Reginald Maudling,
spent over a year on his assignment but met with little
9
success in the capitals of the "Six." During this period,
an event occurred which was to be of importance to the
British plan for a free trade area as well as to the entire
complexion of the European political scene. The event was
the rise to power of General de Gaulle in France.
At first, Great Britain welcomed the appearance of
General de Gaulle because they believed he alone would
demolish the "infant" EEC. However, they soon discovered
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stabilizing the French political scene, the first project
he demolished was the Maudllng Free Trade Area plan. In
November, 1958, some six months after his return to power,
the General informed the press that France had rejected the
Maudling plan, British misjudgment of the General in
this instance was less critical but in an ominous sense an
antecedent of their misjudgment of him in 1962.
The final act of the Free Trade Area drama came in
less than a month at a Ministerial Meeting of the Council
of the OEEC. The British representative, President of the
Board of Trade, Sir David Eccles announced that, if the six
Common Market countries are prepared to extend to the rest
of the OEEC the quota concessions they are making among
themselves, Great Britain would offer similar advantages to
all the OSEC countries. Sir David further declared that,
if the Six postponed consideration of the British offer,
Great Britain would have to consider defensive measures.
The French reply was obvious when their representative,
French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, left the meeting
with a comment to the press that France was not in the
habit of negotiating under duress. The British decision
to resort to "defensive measures," which came in the form
10 ibid.
11Ibid.
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of the European Free Trade Association, was certainly an
ill-fated one considering the harm Great Britain suffered
because of it.
The reaction to the British proposal among the rest
of the Six was mixed. Belgium and Germany were interested
because they saw the Free Trade Area (FTA) as a vehicle for
marketing their industrial goods on a wider basis. Italy
and the Netherlands were opposed to the plan because it
provided no reciprocal concessions for their own products
while allowing others to enter. Of course, the main oppo-
sition to the plan came from France who charged that Great
Britain and her followers were seeking to obtain the bene-
fits of an enlarged European market although they refused
to pay the price the "Six" were willing to pay. Once
France made her firm opposition clear, at the November
meeting of the OEEC, the rest of the Six more or less fell
12into agreement with her.
Shortly after the stormy OEEC meeting, Great Britain
and the remaining European members of the OEEC gathered in a
private meeting to discuss the situation. The end result
was the formation of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) which was set up on July 21, 1959. The convention
12David Cottrell, Politics of the Atlantic Alliance








establishing EFTA for manufactured goods went into effect
13
on May 3, I960, " The organization was essentially based
on a consolidation of trade policies among the seven member
countries. As opposed to the EEC, the EFTA contained no
supranational control features and no common external
tariff. A scheme was set up for a lowering of tariffs on
goods from member states (inter-EFTA trade) at a rate com-
parable to the EEC. The question of what constituted a
nation's goods was attempted to be covered by a set of
rules which determined the origin of the goods.
The formation of EFTA with its seven members and the
existence of the EEC with its six members could not help
but divide Europe into two rival economic groups. While
the British were accused of deliberately forming the "Outer
Seven" in retaliation against the attitude of the "Inner
Six" it did not appear that the other members of EFTA had
required much cohesion, A more balanced view would be to
say that Great Britain was the leader and spokesman for
EFTA. For the year following the break in communications
between the two groups at the OEEC Ministers' meeting, the
situation tended to grow steadily worse. Because both
groups had been primarily concerned with enhancing their
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to a minimum. This lack of intercourse tended to solidify
rather than mitigate the opposing points of view.
The first nation to recognize the dangers and the
futility of the situation and who felt itself in a position
to do something about it was Great Britain. Following the
General Election in October, 1959, by which the Conserva-
tives returned to power, the British government set out on a
deliberate campaign to find ways to improve relations and
to strengthen political ties with the Six. One important
factor which motivated Great Britain's policy at this time
was the fact that the Six had begun to talk more about
closer political ties among themselves. As a result of
this situation, the last months of 1959 saw a renewal of
official political contact between members of the Six and
Great Britain. In November, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British
Foreign Secretary, visited Paris, and Dr. Adenauer, German
Chancellor, visited London. It was during this period that
an understanding, due primarily to British initiative, was
15
reached that more important use could be made of WEU.
One of the first indications of this shift in empha-
sis of British policy came in a speech made by Mr. Profumo,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the British
14Camps, o£. cit











government to the Assembly of the WEU in December, 1959
•
During his opening statement, he confirmed Great Britain's
position with respect to the EEC by saying:
So let me repeat with all the emphasis I can and on
behalf of the British Government • • • that we in
Britain were sincere in our welcome for the Rome
Treaties in 195 7, We have supported it ever since,
and will continue to support this experiment in
European unity which is the Six, We believe it
will succeed; indeed we think it is just as much
in our own interests as it is in the interest of
the whole western world that it should succeed »*•
He went on to clarify Great Britain's position on whether
Great Britain now felt it necessary to draw closer to the
Continent, by saying:
Whereas when WEU came into being we in Britain were
determined to draw Europe closer together, now we
are determined to draw closer to Europe*
On the subject of EFTA and Great Britain's intentions in
helping to set up that organization, he stated: "It is no
part of our policy to set up a club of the Seven in opposi-
tion to the Six, No indeed; we want the Seven to have Six-
17
appeal I" Mr. Profumo then went on to the subject of the
proposed tri-monthly meetings of the Foreign Ministers of
the Six for political consultations. He indicated that it
was the hope of the British government that "if those
16,Proceed ings of the Assembly of The Western European
Union , Fifth Sess ion,December , 1959,""vol'. IV, p. &1.
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consultations are going to go beyond the domestic affairs
of the Six, they might immediately be followed by a meeting
18
of the WEU. Council at ministerial level." The objective
of such meetings of the Council was to prevent a gap from
growing up within WEU between Great Britain and the Six.
The answers of the Six to these British proposals
were certainly far short of British expectations. The only
commitment the Foreign Ministers of the Six made as a re-
sult of their November meeting v/as : "These consultations
[among the Six] will be held without prejudice to those
which take place in NATO and WEU. Wherever necessary these
organizations will be kept informed on matters of interest
to them."19
In spite of this rebuff to their two-edged sugges-
tion of a more meaningful role for WEU, the climate of the
British govarnment opinion and public opinion during 1959
and 1960 was now even more strongly in favor of a closer
association between Great Britain and the Continent. While
it is obvious that the British government was attempting to
use the WEU as one vehicle to bring about this closer asso-
ciation, the very fact that they were doing just that did
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During the period in which the final decision of the
British government to apply for membership in the EEC was
being formulated, several preliminary steps were proposed.
Among these were numerous proposals that Great Britain join
the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom prior to
the major step of joining the EEC,
During 1960, the General Affairs Committee and, in
turn, the Assembly of WEU became advocates of British
accession to the European Communities. Once Great Britain
had made her decision to apply for membership, the Assembly
sought to use every means at its disposal to assist Great
20Britain in joining the Communities.
The general topic of Great Britain's relationship to
the Six was opened for debate in the Assembly in May, 1960,
following a report by Mr. Conte, Rapporteur for the General
Affairs Committee, on the behalf of that Committee. The
report was significant because, in it, the Committee in-
cluded a draft recommendation that member governments of
WEU examine the possibility of the United Kingdom acceding
as a full member of the European Atomic Energy Community
21(Euratom). The Committee's reasons for bringing up this
on
Border, o£. cit
. , p. 32.
21Document 168, Proceedings , Sixth Session, June,
I960, Vol. I, p. 103.
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certainly important but delicate subject were basically
two. First, and perhaps the more obvious one, was that the
WEU provided an excellent meeting ground for Great Britain
and the Six to discuss their differences on more or less
equal footing. The second reason and one which if genu-
inely accepted by the member states would have provided WEU
with a truly more meaningful existence was that WEU's true
area of competence now lay in the non-technical (political)
area.
In the course of his report, Mr. Conte pointed out to
the Assembly that on the technical level the role of WEU
had lost much of its substance. He referred specifically to
the reduction or loss of WEU influence in the Saar, where
the WEU mandate had come to an end in 1959; in the cultural
and social areas , because many of these activities had been
transferred to the Council of Europe; and in the military
area, because most of the initial WEU machinery in the mili-
tary sphere had been transferred to NATO to avoid duplica-
tion. While granting that WEU still retained influence in
the last area because of the Standing Armaments Committee
and the Armaments Agency, Mr. Conte summed up the position
of WEU as follows:
... the main interest of Western European Union is
much more in its non-technical role. This interest
lies in the now accepted practice of meeting to en-





countries on Items on the agenda of other inter-
national organizations. It also ste^s from the
general discussions which have been held in this
Assembly and finally from the fact that the Union
Is an excellent meeting place for the United King-
dom and the six member States of the integrated
communities .22
A section of particular importance, both to the
question of WEU's future role and the main issue of Great
Britain and the Six, was what Mr, Conte called "critical
period in the growth of Europe," In this section, he care-
fully established the dilemma of Great Britain's hesitancy
toward Europe and Europe s extreme impatience with Great
Britain. After having skillfully laid the basis for his
case, he then asked the rhetorical question—what could be
done to reconcile these extreme positions. The answer, which
had been readily apparent throughout Mr, Conte' s presentation,
was British accession to the Communities. However, as a
matter of tactical consideration, the General Affairs Com-
mittee recommended only that Great Britain join Euratom as a
full member. The logic behind this partial approach lay in
the fact that Euratom would be the easiest to Join in a
practical sense, yet it would be an important base upon
which to build.
The reaction of the Assembly to the Committee's










highly favorable, and the recommendation concerning Great
Britain's accession to Euratom was passed by unanimous
23
vote.
The British government's immediate reaction, as pre-
sented by Mr. Profumo during the debate period, was neces-
sarily cautious but hopeful. Certainly, this was the very
sort of encouragement Great Britain was looking for on the
Continent, but Mr, Profumo' s remarks had to be measured
because the British government was still in the process of
deciding what its next move would be.
Although the partial approach seemed like a logical
beginning to the gentlemen of the General Affairs Committee
and the Assembly, their view was not shared by the leaders
of the Community Organization, The position of the Com-
munity's authorities was that the three Communities formed
24
one unit and partial membership was not possible.
Accepting the defeat of the partial approach in its
stride, the General Affairs Committee renewed its efforts
toward finding an acceptable solution by shifting their
thinking toward a more comprehensive solution.
In the autumn of 1960, the WEU Conservative Members
of Parliament began discussing with the British Foreign
23
Ibld ., Vol. II, pp. 135-138.
24Camps, o£„ cit
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Office the merits of fc bold plan to introduce a recommenda-
tion in the Assembly recommending Great Britain's entry
into the Common Market, Shortly thereafter, it was
arranged for the General Affairs Committee to consider this
25proposal which it did.
The results of the General Affairs Committee's con-
sideration of this proposal came in its report to the
Assembly on November 17, 1960. The heart of the report was
contained in the following recommendation:
That taking into account the United Kingdom's obli-
gations to her partners in EFTA and the Commonwealth,
negotiations be opened between the member Governments
of Western European Union with a view to expediting
an arrangement between the European Economic Com-
munity and the United Kingdom, which will result in
the United Kingdom acceding to the European Economic
Community as a full member. ^°
While the introduction of this recommendation would
seem to have been a futile maneuver on the | art of the Com-
mittee, considering the reaction to their recommendation
concerning Great Britain's accession to Euratom, their
reason for presenting it was logical. The primary reason
the recommendation for Great Britain's accession to Euratom
was "pigeonholed" by the Six was that it could not be con-
sidered until Great Britain had made a decision about the
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British M. P.'s would serve the dual purpose of forecasting
the probable British government's impending decision to the
Six, while it would also tend to temper British public
opinion concerning such a policy reversal on the part of
their government.
After lengthy debate on the recommendation during
which everyone reminded everyone else about the difficul-
ties involved concerning Great Britain's joining the EEC,
the recommendation was carried fifty-eight to four with one
abstention, and was then forwarded to the Council for con-
11
sideration." During the Council's review of the recommen-
dation, Mr. Heath, speaking for the British government,
clarified Great Britain's position as follows:
1. Great Britain still considered the business of
the Communities the sole concern of the Six,
and Great Britain could not expect to partici-
pate in it until they had either joined or
formed some association with the Communities.
2. Great Britain was not seriously considering
attempting to enter the Communities' economic
structure without also incurring the accompany-
ing political obligations.
3. Until such time as the entrance of Great Britain
into the Communities was resolved, Great
Britain still wished to share in the political
discussions of "broad European" and "world
wide" problems with the Six. Again, Great
Britain suggested the use of WEU as the body
where such discussions could take place. 28
2 7Ibid ., Vol. IV, p. 19.









With regard to the actual WEU proposal that Great
Britain should accede to the EEC, Mr. Heath stated that the
British government did not wish to express a view on the
recommendation. He again stated that Great Britain was
certainly not afraid of such a move on their part and that,
if and when they did join, it must be on a political as
29
well as economic basis. Here again it is obvious that
until Great Britain's government had definitely decided
what action it was going to pursue, the WEU had no direct
influence on the situation. Certainly, their recommenda-
tion had an indirect influence because it did oblige fete*
member governments to discuss the question openly in the
Council
.
On July 31, 1961, Mr. Macmillan made the historic
announcement of the British government's decision to apply
for membership in Dm EEC. The action certainly appeared
to Justify the efforts of the members of the Assembly to
bring it about. From that moment until General de Gaulle's
fatal pronouncement in January, 1963, the Assembly con-
tinued to bring as much pressure to bear as it could to
speed up the entrance of Great Britain into the EEC. In
December, 1961, the Assembly passed, by a unanimous vote,














"spare no effort whatsoever to insure the success of the
30
negotiations, In the course of the general debate on
the subject in December, 1961, the role of WEU in the nego-
tiations was emphasized by the British representative Mr,
Kirk, when he stated:
... I wish to underline the role which will fall
to WEU and the Assembly in the months ahead. In a
certain sense we have to be the watchdogs in this
matter, ready to spur on the governments if they
show signs of faltering and to help in these very
difficulties can be got around or over and in gen-
eral keeping an eye on them • • • .31
By the June, 1962, meeting of the Assembly, the
negotiations between Great Britain and the Six had fcHMA ~n
progress for over seven months and yet seems to have made
no real progress toward a successful ending. The Assembly
again attempted to bring its influence to bear on the
subject during that session by passing Recommendation 75,
which expressed concern over the course of the negotiations
32
and suggested ways of insuring their speedy completion.
The feelings of the Assembly were so strong about the nego-
tiations that it decided to communicate this recommendation
directly to the member governments rather than going through
30Proceedings , Seventh Session, December 19, 1961,






















the Council. During the general debate, Mr, Heath, speak-
ing as Chairman of the Council, reassured the Assembly that
he was optimistic about the negotiations , and he reaffirmed
Great Britain's willingness to continue on her present
course.
During the December, 1962, meeting of the Assembly,
there appeared to be a certain air of confidence in the
Assembly about the negotiations. This was certainly evi-
denced by a report to the Assembly by the General Affairs
Committee which dealt with the "consequences of the acces-
sion of the United Kingdom for the functioning of the insti-
33tutions of the European Communities."
The recommendations of the Committee, based on their
report, dealt with mechanical details pertaining to the
proper functioning of the Community institutions after the
accession of Great Britain to the Rome Treaties, appar-
ently indicating that the negotiations v/ere approaching a
successful close (at least, in the view of the Committee).
Yet the optimism shown by the Committee, the Assembly in
general, and many other most interested parties was soon to
be shattered.
On January 14, 1963, during General de Gaulle's
eighth press conference, the "death sentence" was in effect
33Ib*d,, December, 1962, Vol. Ill, Document 248.
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passed on the entire subject of Great Britain's entry into
the Common Market. Some fifteen days later, in Brussels,
the negotiations officially came to an end following the
French Foreign Minister's presentation of France's official
34position. A detailed explanation of why the French
government acted as it did is a matter beyond the scope of
this investigation, yet the very act itself certainly had a
definite effect on WEU. It forecast a significant decline
in the prospects for successful completion of the Assem-
bly's first major political battle. In many respects, the
Assembly had placed all its resources behind the British
application, and Great Britain's rejection was a critical
tactical defeat for the Assembly. However, the Assembly
certainly did not give up the fight following the "veto."
On February 25, 1963, the Presidential Committee of
the Assembly, acting on behalf of the Assembly, forwarded a
recommendation to the Council that they meet as soon as
possible to consider the situation the veto had left WEU
and Europe faced with. At the next regular meeting of
the Assembly in June, 1963, the dilemma presented by the
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The general attitude of the Assembly was one of seeking
some method of bringing about the resumption of negotia-
tions. The starting point for the discussions was a series
of draft recommendations accompanied by an explanatory
36
report presented by the General Affairs Committee. The
Committee suggested the following bases for a course of
action to be recommended by WEU:
1. Re-establishment of an atmosphere of confidence.
2. The need for the EEC to continue.
3. The United Kingdom must remain a candidate for
accession even if the resumption of negotia-
tions in the immediate future proves impos-
sible.
4. Conflict between the two economic blocs (EEC and
EFTA).
5. The need to move from economic union to political
authority.
After long and arduous debate, these basic courses of
action became the substance of the Assembly's Recommenda-
tion 95 to the Council of Ministers. The reply to the
recommendation by the Council informed the Assembly that
the Seven Member governments had agreed to hold quarterly
ministerial meetings of WEU devoted to an exchange of views
37
on the main political and economic problems of interest.
36Ibid ., Vol. I, p. 115.
3 7Ibid
.
, December, 1963, Vol. Ill, p. 114.
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Considering the sensitivity with which the member govern-
ments (particularly Great Britain and France) viewed the
entire subject it was obvious that the commitment to
quarterly meetings was as far as they would go.
Gradually, in the year following the veto, it became
apparent that the member governments wished to impose a
moratorium on the question of the accession of the United
Kingdom to the European Communities until they could make a
basic re-evaluation of the situation and could decide
future courses of action. With such a moratorium in effect,
the Assembly of WEU had lost its measure of influence on
the subject, for the time being. However, time has a way
of healing dilemmas such as the one presented by the rejec-
tion of Great Britain's application to the EEC. The ini-
tial indignation created by Great Britain's rebuff has
subsided to a considerable degree. It is evident, particu-
larly in the last year, that the Labor Government in Great
Britain still considers membership in the EEC to be in the
national interest of Great Britain, and it is constantly
exploring the possibilities of locating the mutual ground
upon which her admission will become a reality. Conditions
have changed since the negotiation period of 1961-1962, a
major change for example is the unclear future for NATO,
and with these changes, the eventual admission of Great
Britain to the Communities seems much more promising.
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What Great Britain's entrance into the Communities
would have meant in 1963, and may still mean in 1970, for
WEU in the realm of increased importance is at best an edu-
cated guess. Looking at the earlier possibility first,
which, in the light of subsequent events, appears to have
been less promising for WEU, the tangible gains for the WEU
seemed to lay only in the area of a strengthened political
reputation. Realistically speaking, WEU was merely the
convenient meeting place in which the opposing sides could
conduct their public discussions. The chances for a sig-
nificantly strengthened role for WEU, as a defense or a
political organization appeared slight. The success or
failure of the whole operation in itself appears to have
offered little harm or good to the status of WEU as an
organization, unless, of course, the member states found it
in their interest to attach WEU to the "Community Organiza-
tions" in the event of a successful period of negotiation.
However, in the light of the changes in relation-
ships among the various Western European states and the
crisis which has arisen over the future function and shape
of the Atlantic Alliance which has occurred since 1963, the
prospects for WEU's future seem considerably brighter should
Great Britain finally make her way into the continental
organizations. In view of the apparent bi-polarization
which seems to be taking place within the NATO Alliance,
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the WEU is the logical organization to represent the West-
ern European states in defense matters. When Great Britain
joins Europe, WEU stands ready to become the fourth Com-
munity organization of a "Seven power" Europe. Granted,
structural changes would be in order, the most logical of
which appears to be the merging of the WEU Assembly with
the European Assembly and strengthening of the resultant
body. But even though the WEU's identity would be merged
with the other organizations, the result would be a major
achievement as far as the goals of the WEU are concerned.
The Assembly has worked long and hard, within the limits it
was allowed to operate, to bring Great Britain into Europe;
and when this finally occurs, no matter what the final
status of WEU is, their contributions to the progressive
integration of Europe will be among the most important.
Since the late 1940* s, eight major regional organi-
zations of European and Atlantic membership have been
established to facilitate and promote the common interest
of the member states. While each of the organizations
seemingly was founded with one primary goal and area of com-
petence in mind, the tendency has been for each organization
to attempt to expand its area of activity as it sought
solutions to various problems appearing on the European/
Atlantic scene. The logical result of this situation has
been a great deal of overlap and/or duplication of effort
JutftM ><•':• :in- .i.v. r. .->-i -:; nol^*sln»9'XO tACklfe^* .•>-..., _ . U3W :<..:
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in their various fields of endeavor. As should be evident
from the material already presented, the main problems
facing the WEU have stemmed from this condition of European
organization. Since the mid-1950' s, there has been a
steady stream of proposals to rationalize or simplify this
condition of complexity on the inter-governmental plane in
38Europe, That rationalization or simplification of the
organizational structure of Western Europe is in order is
beyond question, and it is within the parameters of this
problem that WEU has been both interested and active. Cer-
tainly, there has been an element of self-preservation
behind some of the interest displayed by WEU in the various
rationalization plans; however, as is evident from the
debates held by the Assembly, the main concern has been to
find the solution which will best serve the interests of
the member states in the context of the goals the various
organizations were created to work toward. The common
approach contained in all the major proposals to simplify
the organizational framework of Western Europe has been
some manner of reduction/combination of the various parlia-
mentary bodies of the organizations. Because of this, the
38
For a detailed analytical treatment, Dr. J. Allen
Hovey, Jr., The Superparliaments (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 19G6)
.





general topic heading for this subject became the "ration-
alization of European Assemblies."
Since it was created in 1956, the General Affairs
Committee of the WEU Assembly has continually addressed
itself to the various rationalization proposals, A central
objective of the Assembly during the early years of its
life was the attempt to find its political role in the
general European scheme, as was discussed earlier. It was
then logical for the Assembly to give particularly close
scrutiny to the rationalization proposals insofar as they
had a direct bearing on that search. The first major pro-
posal in the life of the Assembly was the Grand Design plan
39
offered by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.
The plan essentially outlined the establishment of an
Atlantic parliament which would replace all the existing
parliamentary organizations and establish a series of com-
missions composed of selected delegates to handle the work
formerly reserved to the Assemblies dissolved. The general
consensus of the Assemblies of the organizations concerned
was that the plan offered a retreat rather than an advance-
ment in terms of the gains already made by the respective.
40Assemblies in being recognized by the member governments.









Very shortly after the demise of the "Grand Design"
scheme, the General Affairs Committee did adopt the same
line of reasoning concerning rationalization with respect
to another situation which was developing. There was a
general concern that the framers of the two new Community
organizations (ESC and Euratom) might possible decide to
establish a fourth European Assembly to provide parliamen-
tary supervision for the new organizations. In a report to
the Assembly, Mr. Struye, Rapporteur, asked that the nego-
tiators strongly examine the possibility of extending the
competence of the Common Assembly of the ECSC to include
41the SEC and Euratom. Among his objections to the crea-
tion of a fourth Assembly, Mr. Struye mentioned that:
- . . effective parliamentary supervision should
principally apply to the general policy of the
authority concerned, the ultimate aim being the
creation of a single European parliamentary body;
The creation of a fourth Assembly would empha-
size fragmentation not unity, increase the cost,
and cause the most grave civil service problems.
As a result of the logic inherent in the Struye Recommenda-
tion, it became the basis for a concerted approach by the
Bureaus of the three existing Assemblies (WEU Assembly,
Common Assembly, and the Consultative Assembly of the
4.1
Document 34, Proceedings , December, 1956, p. 47.
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Council of Europe) to the negotiators of the new treaties, 42
Because the fourth Assembly never came into being, at least
some credit must be reflected on the General Affairs Com-
mittee for its initiative in the matter.
The general tone of the view held by the General
Affairs Committee, and adopted by the Assembly, toward the
various proposals concerning "rationalization of Assemblies"
was clearly evident in the Committee^ report entitled "The
Unification of European Assemblies" of October, 1957. In
his comments, the Rapporteur, Mr, von der Goes von Naters,
expressed the opinion that content of the proposals on the
subject showed a clear lack of contact between the member
governments and the members of Parliament who had direct
experience in the institutions concerned. He went on to
say that any plan for rationalization similar to those
already offered was premature. The general objection of-
fered by the Rapporteur in 1957, and one which would be
applied to the subsequent proposals offered on this matter,
was that they all contained one major deficiency in that they
would be a step backward in terms of the status won by the
existing Assemblies, The Assembly concurred with the
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• • • that the European Assembly does not remain
under the tutelage of the consultative status
granted in 1949 [Consultative Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe], but has responsibilities and powers
in no circumstances less than those established in
1955 by the Charter of the Assembly of Western
European Union. 44
It is quite evident from the Assembly's actions that
they would not then, nor in the future, endorse a proposal
for simplifying the plan of inter-governmental organization
in Europe if it meant a loss of the competence already
gained by the various organizations. And it is not un-
usual that the WEU Assembly should feel more strongly about
the subject than any of the other bodies because the Assem-
bly technically possessed more competence in the parliamen-
tary field. Even considering the fact that the Assembly
possessed only consultative status, the Charter which it
granted itself contained a number of features which gave it
more independence than either the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe or the Common Assembly of the Communi-
ties. Among the most important of these features are:
1. Its ability to transmit a "motion to disagree
to the Council concerning the content of the
Council's Annual Report.
2. The prerogatives of WEU Committees to forward
questions to the Council via the President
of the Assembly and the provision that un-
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3. The ability of the President of the Assembly
to convene extraordinary sessions of the
Assembly.^5
Although these features in practice did not add to
the Assembly's real political power, they were a definite
advancement toward establishing parliamentary supervision
in inter-governmental organizations.
Although the Assembly had definitely established its
basic suspicion concerning the plans for rationalization,
it, by no means, abandoned the subject. In fact, the sub-
ject of "rationalization of Assemblies" and inspection of
the subsequent proposals in this direction remained a pri-
mary area of work for the General Affairs Committee. In a
comprehensive report on the subject, in July, 1958, Mr.
Struye, Rapporteur for the Committee, reviewed both the
functional and institutional approaches offered for ration-
alization, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of
46both. After a lengthy critical review of the material
concerned, Mr. Struye then went on to its most important
section, which was the transmission of a suggestion made by
Furfer, President of the Common Assembly of the ECSC.
Basically, Mr. Furfer 1 s suggestion was a very elementary
45 See supra
, pp. 40-41.
Document 91, Proceedings , June, 1958, p. 142.


















plan for Increased cooperation among the existing Assem-
blies containing the following points
:
1, Instead of existing arrangements have a joint
annual meeting of the three Assemblies.
2. Have the Bureaus of the Assemblies draw up rules
and an agenda.
The Assembly indicated its approval for the low key
approach to greater cooperation in its Resolution 9 of July,
1958, in which the Bureau of WEU was instructed:
To contact the Bureaux of the Consultative Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe and of the European
Parliamentary Assembly for the following purposes
1. To convene at a fixed date an annual joint
meeting of the thrtc European Assemblies . • . •
2« To set up a Standing Group of the three
Bureaux • • • ,^ 7
Despite the Assembly's enthusiasm for this approach, its
views were not generally shared, and the recommendation
brought little in the way of tangible results.
After 1958, the Assembly and the General Affairs
Committee, in particular, continued to give close attention
to the new proposals for rationalization; however, little
has been accomplished in the way of gaining any consensus
for the various plans. The Atlantic and the European politi-
cal scenes have witnessed a number of problems concerning
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relationships and goals which have tended to overshadow the
business of simplifying the organizational structure of
Europe. Some of the major factors were Great Britain's
attempt to join Europe and its temporary failure, and the
policies pursued by the French government in many key
political issues. All these factors are directly inter-
related, and it is quite obvious that, until a large measure
of agreement is reached among the major states of Europe
concerning their own and Europe's future, little progress
will be made,
A common feature among the many plans offered for
rationalizing both European and Atlantic inter-governmental
cooperation is the establishment of a consultative assembly
for the Atlantic area and the evolution through continua-
tion of one European Assembly to speak for Europe within
the Western Alliance, A feature common to almost every
plan for rationalizing the European Assemblies includes
either the disestablishment or severe limiting of the Assem-
bly of the WEU primarily through the transfer of its func-
tions to existing assemblies or a new more comprehensive
one. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this even-
tuality seems both logical and certain once the present
obstacles to increased European cooperation are surmounted.
When that point is reached, the WEU Assembly will have
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behind a number of important legacies in the field of inter-
governmental parliamentary supervision.
The Assembly has been the only parliamentary body of
its type to hm empowered to debate the broad questions of
European and Western defense. It has experienced a number
of frustrations in attempting to fulfill what it considered
its role to be; however, these frustrations and the com-
promises reached because of them between the Assembly and
the Council can serve as guideposts to its successor in
this field. According to Dr. Hovey:
The Assembly's main claim to success lies not in the
area of substantive resolutions implemented, although
there were instances of such, but of strengthening
parliamentary and public understanding and support
of Western defense effort. 48
In addition to its primary contribution of exposing the
questions of Western defense to public debate, the Assembly
has made certain definite contributions to inter-governmental
parliamentary supervision. Through oversight primarily, the
Assembly was created with few rules to guide it; because of
this situation, the parliamentarians were forced to estab-
lish the rules (the Charter) under which it would operate.
With this freedom, the Assembly gave itself powers, such as
the "motion to disagree" among others, which attempted to
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degree) the Assembly, Although the Assembly had little
chance of coercing the member governments through these
devices, their importance lies in the fact that the Assem-
bly's experience here will be invaluable in creating the
future shape of European organization. Effective parlia-
mentary supervision will be mandatory as Europe progresses
toward its next level of organization, even though that
supervision may well remain "consultative" for an indefi-
nite period of time. The Assembly will pass from the scene
in time, but it will have left its mark on European organi-
zation*
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CHAPTER V
THE FUTURE ROLE OF WEU IN WESTERN EUROPE
The future of WEU is at best uncertain, considering
that it is an actor of secondary importance in the complex
political arena in which the major nations of the Western
Alliance operate. Because it is a purely inter-governmental
organization, dependent completely on the decisions of its
seven member governments, WEU cannot, in and of itself, do
much to alter its own destiny outside the limits of the
consultative status which has been conferred upon it. Its
contributions toward enhancing the collective future of its
member states, as described earlier, have been significant
in many respects, but they are by no means monumental. WEU
has played a secondary role in the affairs of Western
Europe, except for momentary lapses into the limelight when
it served the interest of its members. Yet, in view of a
number of factors and developments in the ISSO's, there is a
very strong possibility that WEU does have an important
role to play in the future. This future role is dependent
upon two major changes in the present set of relationships
in the Western Alliance. The first change will be the ad-
mission of Great Britain to the Communities sometime in the
next one to three years. And the second change, which is
directly related to, although not entirely dependent on,
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the first is the gradual establishment of the dumb-bell
(U.S. -Western Europe) relationship in the Western Alliance.
That Great Britain will join the Communities in the
near future is a prediction which is dependent on a number
of variables; however, there seems to be every indication
that it will happen. The British government made the deci-
sion to join in 1961, and it has never repudiated that
choice because it is in the long-range national interest of
Great Britain to join Europe. The tactics of General de
Gaulle certainly hurt British pride and momentarily clouded
over the real British need to become a part of Europe, but
the wounds caused by France are gradually healing. This is
evidenced by Prime Minister Wilson's recent speaking tour
on the Continent to explore the obstacles which have to be
removed before Great Britain can join. Through his
speeches and actions, the British Prime Minister has
pledged himself to go to any reasonable lengths to get
Great Britain in the Common Market. When Great Britain
does join, the prospects for WEU's future will be enhanced
considerably. By joining the "Continent," Great Britain
cannot help but reduce the special relationship she has
enjoyed with the United States. She will be playing a
different role in that her outlook will necessarily become
^Tirae, January 27, 196 7, pp. 26-27.
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"Europeanized, " which will undoubtedly have a direct influ-
ence on the existing set of relationships in the NATO Alli-
ance. It is within the context of a revision of the
relationships within NATO that a new role for WEU is en-
visioned.
Since the late 1950' s, the NATO Alliance has been
troubled by a number of problems which have weakened the
apparent solidarity the organization possessed in the early
1950' s. The mid-1960' s finds NATO in a period of crisis
with respect to the organization's future. This period of
crisis is most conveniently blamed on the narrow national-
istic aspirations of France's President; yet granting that
the General has not made solutions any easier to find, the
roots of the problem go beyond Just France's actions. The
basic problem is that the dynamically resurgent Europe of
the 1960 *s is not content with the superior-inferior rela-
tionship vis-A-vis the United States that she was content
with in the early years of the Alliance. This dissatis-
faction, on the part of the Western European nations and
the tremors it has sent through NATO, must eventually lead
to the establishment of a new set of relationships within
the Alliance. What must necessarily result is some modi-
fied version of the "dumb-bell" concept within the Alliance,
meaning essentially that the United States would grant a
measure of equality to the "Seven Power Europe" in the
*rii no £:
'•':..•. 4HVV9'I » So iXi:-' V' "tl .3DOS
wan .
.b^nolL
.A 0T> I'O&tl *4ftl ?
-q * i 5*1
*lw
asi* t'»Drus"i ftl
IT .. - op «»j co aiooi
lo -• Zittt 33i\Z ad




id bXuow k»4a4E be42tfU *(ii if-
121
Alliance decision making. When this occurs, the WEU, as
the military organization of the Seven, will be the logical
organization to supervise the military contributions of the
Seven to MATO. The form of the existing WEU organization
will, no doubt, be changed if it becomes, in essence, the
fourth Community Organization, but the organization itself
is ready and able to assume that function.
One extremely important function the WEU might ac-
quire by such a reordering of the European scene, as
described above, is to become the repository for a European
nuclear deterrent. Although the nuclear dilemma within the
Alliance has been an outward manifestation of the deeper
problems described earlier, the solution of the nuclear
problem would certainly be one major objective of a revised
set of relationships within MATO.
A detailed discussion of the "nuclear dilemma" exist-
ing within the Atlantic Alliance is beyond the scope of
this research; yet because one of the many proposed solu-
tions for this problem involves WEU directly, it is neces-
sary to discuss the suitability of WEU for such a role as
well as speculating on the probability of this particular
solution being chosen.
The basic issue involved in NATO's "nuclear dilemma"
is the fact that some of America's Western European allies
want a genuine voice in the political control of the nuclear
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deterrent guarding Western Europe against the threat posed
by Soviet Russia. In 1949, the United States committed its
military power to the defense of Western Europe when it
signed the NATO Treaty, At that time, as the prime compo-
nent of its commitment, the United States guaranteed the
physical security of the area by its nuclear capability.
It was logical then that the Europeans willfully accepted
the fact that the ultimate means of their own survival was
controlled independently by the United States. The menac-
ing stance of the Soviet Union coupled with their own
inability to guarantee their own survival could have led to
no other logical conclusion. However, the conditions which
contributed to the willing acceptance of American unilateral
control in the 1940* s have changed considerably in the past
fifteen years. The economically-prostrate Europe of 1949
has reawakened in a burst of dynamic economic development to
challenge seriously its former relationship with the United
States. With this economic transformation has come the
desire, on the part of some of America's NATO partners, to
share in the control of the weapons which guard their ulti-
mate survival,
American nuclear weapons policy in NATO has evolved
from a policy of unilateral control in the early years of
2Harold L. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign
Policy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964)
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the Alliance to one of nuclear sharing with bilateral con-
trols in the 1960 's in partial answer to pressure from
3Europe, But the existing bilateral controls continue to
impose an effective American veto over the use of the weap-
ons. American policy has remained one of alliance-with-
denial and sharing-with-secrecy for the expressed reason of
preventing the proliferation of nuclear capabilities, yet
the policy has not prevented other nations from acquiring a
nuclear capability. For years, the United States has
pledged to consult with our NATO partners, time permitting,
prior to using nuclear weapons. However, this offer has
not been received with unanimous satisfaction by our allies
in Europe. Certainly, the most outstanding critic of
American policy in this area has been General de Gaulle as
evidenced by his actions in NATO and in completing an inde-
pendent French nuclear capability.
The nuclear-sharing issue is even further complicated
by the fact that Great Britain, because of her independent
achievement of a nuclear capability, has been privileged to
enjoy a closer "sharing" relationship with the United States
than any of the rest of the NATO countries—much to the dis-
gust of France. While employing its nuclear capability to
3Ibid ., pp. 17-18.
4Raymond H. Dawson, "What Kind of NATO Nuclear
Force?," The Anna 1
3
(January, 1964), pp. 34-36.
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protect itself and Europe from the Soviet Union, the United
States has come to acknowledge a mutual interest with the
Soviet Union. That interest, being to preserve and maintain
the bipolar configuration of nuclear capability, because of
mutual agreement that proliferation of nuclear weapons is
5inherently dangerous.
The proposed United States solution to the problem
of granting its European allies a greater voice in the
management and operation of NATO's nuclear defense in the
early 1960*s was various versions of the highly controver-
sial Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). While the proposed
American program included European participation in the
handling and operation of the weapons, it still retained an
effective American veto over the use of the weapons—the
very issue the Europeans have contested. Consequently, the
MLF program was not able to provide an answer to the prob-
lem.
The search for a mutually-acceptable solution to the
nuclear dilemma has generated an enormous amount of research
and theorizing as to ways to solve the problem by a wealth
of experts on both sides of the Atlantic. The subject has
been dealt with in numerous books and dozens of probing
articles, as well as being a topic for serious discussion
5 Ibid.
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in many governments and parliamentary bodies, including the
Assembly of the WEU.
In the area of speculation as to alternative solu-
tions to the present "dilemma," the various authorities on
the subject have, for the most part, agreed on the exist-
ence of five general plans. These include:
1. Strategic divorce—a non Atlantic pattern of
political organization for the West. Europe
looking to its own defenses strategic as well
as tactical, creating its own national deter-
rents where possible.
2. Status quo—a continuation of the dominant United
States monopoly of nuclear warheads within
NATO accompanied by a continuation of bilateral
agreements between the United States and Allies
with a nuclear capability.
3. A non-nuclear NATO—a denuclearization of the
NATO Alliance shifting to a complete conven-
tional stance within the Alliance while relying
competely on the United States to provide stra-
tegic deterrence from across the Atlantic.
4. A NATO deterrent—a force somewhat similar to
the MLF force suggested by the United States
in which the United States forces would remain
under national control, but ways would be
sought to widen the area of European participa-
tion in command and control of such weapons.
5. An independent European contribution to the
existing Western deterrent—a force entirely
under the political control of Europeans, but
comprising an integral part of the total
Western deterrent. 6
Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition : The Future
of the Atlantic Alliance (New YorleT Frederick A. Praeger,
TS65T7 pp. 215-2177
>*i ( a»ibod Y^*^o*&ftxX:i*q boa sixwaiaisvo^ fata
/XdaeaaA
nue^X* o3 a«




sXq U -isasf evJt^
®qoi. i*»W »rii ?tc3. noxisslflAQ-
XXew !$•#*
aidb XjsaoJ. two *




XJ>19:tej • y^ h»ln*qwmW3B QTAA




:•;:.. tit iwiMMMi MM
sonciXXA OTAM
•1 'IdJsc.^ :< -.
AM A






56 1£ srii nsblv/ o^ .. .ipjjo«
nseqoio bn*q»bai nA »|





«|*||«£^ f4 j-|^p*Mit .w , ; ,x?iA »i•..'
126
It is in the area of this last broad alternative
(No. 5) that, as suggested by many authorities on the sub-
ject, WEU may find a new sense of purpose and being. While
each of the suggested alternatives have advantages and dis-
advantages inherent in their solutions, they will be men-
tioned only to the extent that they are relevant to
alternative five. The suitability of WEU for such a role,
as suggested in alternative five, and the probability of
WEU receiving such a function are the primary areas of con-
cern so that no direct attempt will be made to prove or
disprove the worth of the various other solutions.
The prospect of an independent European contribution
to the American-controlled Western deterrent is certainly a
promising and, in some ways, an attractive solution to the
present nuclear dilemma. Any such solution would have to
have American concurrence to render it feasible; yet, while
this concurrence was out of the question before, the situa-
tion has changed and will continue to change. When Great
Britain joins the Communities, the United States will have
to contend with an even more uniform European viewpoint.
In the area of defense, Great Britain's nuclear capability
will, to a large degree, "belong" to Europe, thus making
the negotiating position of the United States in NATO even
more difficult on the subject of nuclear weapons. It is
quite possible also that the French position of retaining
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national control of nuclear weapons might gradually evolve
toward accepting the idea of a European deterrent in view
of the new set of European relationships which would result
from Great Britain's association with the Continent, In
this respect, the United States would be in a good position
to require that the donation of the French nuclear capa-
bility to a European deterrent as its price for supporting
the raising of a European deterrent. If the United States
approved of the idea politically, it is certain that she
would agree to help in its construction (financially and
technologically), thus providing a tangible factor to
induce French agreement or, at least, to induce the other
nations of the "Seven" to exert pressure on France, In
view of past and contemporary American positions on the
subject of non-American nuclear capabilities, it is clear
that the United States would like to continue to avoid the
sanctioning of a European deterrent, yet indications are
that she will slowly be forced into it. Unless the Ameri-
can commitment to continued strengthening of the Western
Alliance changes, it seems very probable that a European
contribution to the Western deterrent is the price she will
have to accept.
Accepting that American concurrence is a necessary
prerequisite, there are a number of other major factors to
consider. First, as suggested above, the existing nuclear
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powers in Europe must be in agreement that such a common
deterrent, to which their own capabilities would be donated,
would be in their own as well as the European common inter-
est. This could be the major fault in the whole case for a
European deterrent in view of the past actions of France,
yet there is the distinct possibility that France will
adopt the more European view if she is convinced that Ameri-
can influence has really declined in European affairs, A
second major consideration concerning a European deterrent
is that of political control for such a capability. What
organization or institutional framework would be best
suited for both making the broad political decisions about
the nature and use of the force and for building, maintain-
ing, anc modernizing it.
WEU, as the military "arm" of a "Seven Power Europe"
is obviously the logical organization to assume at least
most of, if not all of, the responsibilities concerning a
European deterrent. Aside from new treaty amendments to
provide guidelines for the deterrent and the raising of
WEU's staff to the numbers needed to carry out such respon-
sibilities, the existing organization seems quite capable
of carrying out the task. The Council would provide the
necessary source of political direction required while the
Assembly would continue to fulfill its role of providing
the parliamentary scrutiny for such an undertaking. Although
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the WEU could assume the initial task with a minimum of
change, it is quite evident that a number of weaknesses would
be inherent in this situation with respect to elements of
"control" the WEU could exert over the member states. If
the main weakness of the present organization—its purely
consultative status—is perpetuated in the treaty amendments,
the credibility of the deterrent's effectiveness will be
significantly reduced. This then leads to the logical con-
clusion that some elements of supranational control would
have to be invested in the organization. This would, in-
deed, be a major decision for the Seven to entertain; yet,
even considering that it broaches the question of the
desirability of integration in the defense field, it would
be the logical extension of integration in the economic
sector. If both logic, necessity, and political consensus
lead to such a historic decision by the Seven and an ele-
mentary amount of supranationalism is introduced in the
defense sector, this will require a re-examination of the
organizational structure of Seven Power Europe. This may
well take place even outside the question of a deterrent
when the WEU becomes, in essence, the fourth organization
of the Seven, but the same general changes would result.
The major change which would result would be the
merging of the role of the WEU Assembly with that of the
European Parliament. In addition, it seems very probable
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that an executive body to control the activities of the
organization would be required. The exact composition of
the executive body
—
percentage of civilians and military
—
is a consideration the details of which could be worked out
later.
The introduction of supranational control in the
military sector through WEU would certainly be the second
major step in Western Europe's search for her identity in
the future. The WEU's organizational structure would
necessarily be altered although its true role in the Euro-
pean scene would, at last, have been found and, at the same
time, it would have made a significant advancement toward
one of its goals—the progressive integration of Europe.
Although this argument in support of WEU becoming
the possessor of a European deterrent and in reality becom-
ing the European defense organization is supported by logic
and speculation based upon recent events in Europe, the
description of obstacles in the path of such an eventuality
has been brief and in the case of the German question omitted,
This is not to suggest that the obstacles are ones which will
be easily surmounted for quite the opposite is true. Yet,
if the determination of the Western European nations to find
the best form of association possible continues, these ob-
stacles can be overcome in time, and the solution presented
will become more feasible with the passage of that time.
mrritff tiaimr
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The first published argument in favor of WEU becom-
ing Europe's nuclear armed defense organization came in
1958 in Ben T. Moore's book, NATO and the Future of Europe * 7
In his argument, Mr, Moore suggested that because the mem-
bers of Euratom "have the capability to develop in time an
integrated strategic deterrent" and because Great Britain
could add significantly to the success of such an under-
taking, WEU, with its combined membership, offered an ideal
solution for such an undertaking. In December, 1959, a
proposal for a Joint European Strategic Nuclear Force was
submitted to the WEU Assembly by Mr. F. W. Mulley, Rappor-
teur for the Defense Committee.
Mr. Mulley, a British Labor Member of Parliament
since 1950, was a British delegate to the Council of Europe
and the WEU from 1958 through 1961, and was Vice President
of the Assembly in 1960. He is a respected observer of and
participant in debate over European political issues and has
made a considerable number of suggestions toward their solu-
tions, as is evidenced by his book, The Politics of Western
Defence .
Mr. Mulley' s plan was essentially to set up the
political machinery within the framework of WEU to control
7Ben T. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New
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all the nuclear weapons produced in the member countries.
His intention was bhat none of the national nuclear forces
could Joe used without the sanction and authority of the WEU
Council of Ministers* The proposal called for an end point
or political usage control and did not include control
restraints at the lower levels, such as joint production of
weapons, sharing of secrets, or sharing of weapons, Mr,
Mulley did envision that machinery might he created, upon
the success of the initial plan, to make nuclear weapons
research and production a Joint venture} however, he did
not consider these measures necessary or essential elements
in the establishment of political control of the weapons.
^
The plan was supported by a majority of the members
of the Assembly, after which it was recommended to the
Council where it found little support. The plan became
less and less attractive to the individual member govern-
ments for a number of reasons. In France, the successful
nuclear test explosions and the decision to acquire an inde-
pendent nuclear capability reduced the likelihood of French
support. Great Britain, during that period, had decided to
abandon the "Blue Streak" program in favor of the American
"Skybolt ' air-to-ground missile, thus strengthening Great
F. W. Mulley, The Politics of Western Defense (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 86-87.
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Britain's nuclear defense ties with the United States and,
thereby, decreasing the possibility that her defense pos-
ture would take on a European orientation. With these two
essential governments removed from the support column, the
Mulley plan no longer seems feasible. Mr. Mulley's evalua-
tion of the situation was that "interdependence remains a
very good theme for political addresses: it still has to
attain the status of practical policy.
Following the veto of Great Britain* s application to
the Common Market, Mr. Mulley shifted his support to some
sort of European deterrent within the NATO framework. His
main reason for feeling that a NATO plan, instead of a WEU
plan, was more feasible was the policy shift on the part of
the United States in that it has begun to strongly push the
MLF-NATO Nuclear Force—in answer to the dilemma and the
actions of General de Gaulle in his unwillingness to share
control of his force de frappe with Europe or to partici-
pate in a NATO nuclear plan. In view of these actions and
the continued attempt of the WEU Council of Ministers to
avoid any impression of creating a block within NATO, Mr.
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deterrent would have a harmful divisive within NATO as well
as having little chance of success.
Some American analysts and research organizations
continued to promote the idea of a European deterrent under
WEU in spite of the events of 1960-1963, In addition to
the favorable aspects mentioned earlier, the fact that
WEU's treaty life is some fifty years and that WEU has had
considerable experience in arms control are also brought up
as further proof of the feasibility of the idea. Building
the Atlantic World , a Foreign Policy Research Institute
book, published in 1963, presents a very detailed defense
of such a plan leading to the conclusion that when Western
Europe possesses its own credible deterrent it will be in a
position where it is able to bargain as an equal with the
12United States concerning the defense of the West, In a
more recent book by Mr, Henry Kissinger, a similar plan for
an Allied Nuclear Force under the control of WEU is sug-
13gested as a meaningful solution to nuclear dilemma.
F, W. Mulley, "Nuclear Weapons," Orbis (Spring,
1963), pp. 36-37.
12Robert Strausz-Hupe , James E. Dougherty, and Wil-
liam R, Kintner, Building the Atlantic World (New York:
Harper and Row, 1963), pp,T2o-230.
13
Henry A, Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 176.
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In view of the "expert" support cited above for WEU
to become a "nuclear power" and considering the fact that
conditions are even more favorable now than they were when
these earlier arguments were offered, it is imperative that
the merits of this solution be kept in the foreground of
discussion. The acceptability of this solution is depend-
ent on other factors
—
principally the admission of Great
Britain to the Communities
—
yet it can and will be the
second step toward the strengthening of Western Europe and
the Western Alliance.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The debacle caused by the failure of the European
Defense Community in 1954 caused significant pressures to
be exerted by the United States and certain Western Euro-
pean nations to find an acceptable substitute for that
organization. The major problem to be solved, particularly
as viewed from the Western side of the Atlantic, was the
legalized rearming of West Germany and her admission to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to bolster the
defenses of that Alliance* The organization, which was
quickly agreed upon as the acceptable substitute, was the
Western European Union, an inter-governmental organization
built on the lifeless structure of the Brussels Treaty
Organization. The WEU was born of crisis to solve one main
problem—the rearmament of Germany—yet the organization
was given a formal structure and a number of broad func-
tions to carry out. Under the Paris Agreements of 1954,
WEU was to have a primary role in defense matters , and it
was also given competence in political, economic, social,
and cultural matters. Yet, once the organization was
created and the machinery by which German rearmament could
be controlled was established, the member states refused to
make use of the WEU in pursuance of the goals they had
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established for it. The WEU was established on a purely
inter-governmental basis; therefore, it contained no inher-
ent powers by which it could enhance its own position.
Even supervision of the Saar, which was envisioned as an
important responsibility of the WEU, was denied to the
organization when the Saar chose to join Germany. Thus,
shortly after its creation, the WEU future usefulness
seemed extremely limited.
The paradoxical position in which the new organiza-
tion was placed, having been apparently given an important
role in European organization and then having been aban-
doned, was caused by a combination of factors. The primary
factors were the decision of the Six to return to an ex-
panded form of economic integration and the decision by
Great Britain to continue to abstain from the Six's form of
supranational organization. The division between Great
Britain and the Six was further aggravated by Great Bri-
tain's decision to erect a rival organization in the form
of the European Free Trade Association. In view of the
basic split between Great Britain and the Six, there is
little doubt concerning the main source of WEU's non use;
yet in spite of that disunity in membership, the WEU managed
to do more than just survive. The organization has used
every means at its disposal to gain the role apparently
established for it by the Paris Agreements. The main
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source of life and initiative in WEU has come from the
Assembly, the parliamentary organ of WEU established by one
short reference in the enumerated responsibilities of the
Council, The Assembly has, by no means, been brilliantly
successful in its attempts to establish a useful role for
WEU; yet, because of the nature of the organization, there
was no real chance that the Assembly could be entirely suc-
cessful without the concurrence of the member states. The
WEU Assembly was established with consultative status, and
it could do no more than to work toward full implementation
of that status.
Despite its non use by the seven governments, the
Assembly of WEU has made a number of constructive contribu-
tions to the progress of European organization. The Assem-
bly has used its primary role as the only parliamentary
body of its type empowered to debate publicly the issues of
Western security and defense to bring a new awareness con-
cerning the nature of these problems to both the European
public and the parliamentarians of the member states. Be-
cause of its unique establishment, the Assembly was allowed
to write its own Charter, In doing so, the Assembly
granted itself a number of powers, such as the "motion to
disagree," which marked a significant gain toward making
the defense efforts of the member states responsive, to a
degree, to inter-governmental parliamentary supervision.
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The degree was limited in WEU's case to a very large degree,
but the precedent is there for future organizations to
learn from, WEU was granted and played a useful mediation
role between Great Britain and the Six—once Great Britain
had decided her destiny lay with Europe, That the initial
effort failed is no reflection on the WEU, which, in a
sense, staked its political future on Great Britain's ad-
mission to Europe. The Assembly is still dedicated to
Great Britain's admission, and it continues to work, in the
context of its own role, to achieve what it believes is the
only real future for Europe, The Assembly has also con-
tributed significantly to the debate over the rationaliza-
tion of European organization by examining each proposal on
the basis of its merit* When the rationalization occurs,
and it will, the very experience the Assembly can offer will
be of no mean value to that new organization.
Although narrowly limited by the amount of coopera-
tion it has received from the member states, the WEU,
through the activities of the Agency for the Control of
Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, has made a
visible contribution (though not large) to two problems
Europe will have to deal with in the future. They are the
problems of arras control and standardization of weapons for
both financial and efficiency reasons. These two subsidiary
organs of WEU have carried out their respective roles with a
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high degree of dedication; and although their activities
have been limited, they will still provide a useful store
of experience in dealing with these problems in the future.
Since its foundat..,>n in 1955, the WEU has undergone
a reduction of functional areas of responsibility. Aside
from its parliamentary function ana Mm activities of the
AvCOA and the SAC, the WEU very logically turned over its
remaining defense functions to the broader, more competent
NATO Organization. After a lengthy period of debate, the
Assembly relinquished WElPs responsibilities in social and
cultural matters to the Council of Europe, thereby eliminat-
ing a major source of duplication of effort in European
organization. Even though given a responsibility in the
economic area, WEU never acknowledged this as a legitimate
area of responsibility because of the superior abilities of
other organizations in this field. This logical reorgani-
zation of tasks has led some to minimize the contributions
made by WEU in European organization and to assume that it
has no useful purpose either now or in the future.
The contributions made by WEU have not been spec-
tacular; yet, considering the narrow role it has been al-
lowed to play, the WEU, in particular the Assembly, has
worked steadily to fulfill its responsibilities and has
laid a constructive foundation for future parliamentary
efforts in the field of European defense. For the present,
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there is no reason to assume that WEU's position or role in
Europe will be significantly strengthened; however, the
organization will still continue to play a useful role
within its operating parameters. The future, however,
holds the brightest hope for a significant strengthening
of WEU's position in European organization.
The nation states of Europe are presently faced with
the solution of two key political questions: whether Great
Britain will be allowed to join the Communities and the
final set of relationships in the Western Alliance which
will be acceptable to both the United States and Europe.
WEU's future as a significant organization is directly
dependent on the outcome of these political issues. There
are strong indications that Great Britain will be admitted
to the Communities within a short period of time. When
this happens, the resolution of relationships between
Europe and the United States should follow in a reasonable
length of time, resulting in a greater measure of independ-
ence and responsibility being granted to Europe within the
Alliance. The most visible sign of this new set of rela-
tionships will be the establishment of a distinctly Euro-
pean contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent. If the
above speculation proves to be correct, WEU will find
itself charged with two important functions.
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First, as the military organization of the "Seven
Power Communities," it is reasonable to assume it will be
given a greater amount of cooperation by the member states
and thus will be able to play a significant role in Euro-
pean defense policy. The logical organization to supervise
and control a European deterrent is obviously the WEU—it
is again reasonable to assume that it will acquire this
function should the above predictions prove to be true.
With these two additions in responsibility, WEU will then
have a definite and important role in Europe.
Should the above predictions prove to be incorrect,
or should Europe decide to agree to a perpetuation of its
existing relationship with the United States even if Great
Britain joins the Continent, then WEU's future offers no
bright hopes. But in view of the present debate over the
existing relationships in NATO, the chances of this solu-
tion being acceptable seem poor. Also, another possibility
should be mentioned. Should Europe decide to proceed with
genuine political integration in the near future, the
utility of WEU would rapidly diminish. However, in view of
the resiliency of national sovereignty above in the major
European states today, the prospect of political integra-
tion in the near future is remote.
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The purpose of this research was to exajnine and
analyze the experiences and contributions of the
Western European Union in the li^ht of the organization's
purposes and objectives and in view of the attempts
toward European integration, in order to provide a basis
in which to justify a positive view concerning WEU's
future role in Western Europe. The basic data gathering
method used in conducting this study was a Chronological
review of documents and minutes of the WEU Assembly,
published in the Proceedings of the Assembly . This
primary source material was supplemented by numerous
oks and articles concerning political, economic, and
military activity in Western Europe. The basic eofl«
elusion arrived at because of this research is that in
view of tne contempory political problems and prospects
in the Atlantic Alliance and in Western Europe, the
Western European Union is destined, to play a very
significant role in the future.
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